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The Extraterritorial Effect of Criminal Convictions
"The Courts of no country execute the penal laws of another. ,, 1
Thus Chief Justice Marshall phrased a fundamental doctrine which has been
universally recognized. 2 And since the "full faith and credit" clause of the
Federal Constitution 3 applies only to civil judgments, 4 it might be thought
that criminal convictions should have no effect whatever upon the convict,
by way of civil disability, except in the jurisdiction wherein the conviction
was rendered. But this result has by no means always been reached.
Suppose, for example, that State X does not permit a person convicted of
felony to hold public office. If a man convicted of felony in State Y is de-
prived of his office in State X, can it be said that State X is attempting to en-
force the penal laws of State Y? Some courts consider the disabilities as part
of the penal judgment, 5 hence unenforcible extraterritorially. Others reach
a contrary result by reasoning that disqualifications are not part of the judg-
ment of conviction, but mere consequences which flow from it.6 It has been
pointed out that ineligibility is imposed upon the convict, not for the purpose
of punishing him but because, by the commission of a crime, he has shown
himself a person unworthy of trust, and also in order to protect the public.7
An interesting, but not very enlightening, distinction was sought to be drawn
by one judge between denial of a privilege never enjoyed and denial of a
right previously conferred.8
There is also a division of authority as to what event gives rise to the
disabilities. In giving extraterritorial effect to criminal convictions it has
sometimes been declared that the commission of the crime, and not the con-
viction therefor, works the disqualification, the judgment of conviction being
conclusive evidence of its commission.9 On the other hand, a foreign con-
viction has been held not to disqualify, on the ground that the conviction, and
not merely the commission of the crime, disqualifies the convict, 10 and the
i. The Antelope, io Wheat. 66, 123 (U. S. 1825).
2. Banco de Vizcaya v. Don Alfonso de Borbon y Austria, [1935] I K. B. i4o; see Wis-
consin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U. S. 265, 289 (1888) ; Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U. S. 657,
669 (1892) ; Huntington v. Attrill, [1893] A. C. 150, 156; RESTATZMENT, CoNFLICr OF LAWS
(934) § 427; GOODRicH, CoNFLiCr OF LAws (1927) § 8.
3. U. S. CoNsT. Art. IV, § i.
4. Commonwealth v. Green, 17 Mass. 515 (1822) ; Sims v. Sims, 75 N. Y. 466 (1878).
Contra: Chase v. Blodgett, io N. H. 22 (1838) semble; State v. Candler, 3 Hawks 393 (N.
C. 1824) semble.
5. See State v. Grant, 79 Mo. 113, 122 (1883) ; Sims v. Sims, 75 N. Y. 466, 469 (1878).
6. State v. Jones, 82 N. C. 685 (i88o) ; see State ex rel. Attorney General v. Irby, 8I
S. W. (2d) 419, 423 (Ark. 1935) ; McKannay v. Horton, 151 Cal. 711, 720, 91 Pac. 598, 6oi
(i9o7) ; Chase v. Blodgett, io N. H. 22, 29 (1838) ; State ex rel. Olson v. Langer, 256 N. W.
377, 387 (N. D. 1934).
7. Ex parte Brounsall, 2 Cowp. 829 (K. B. 1778) ; see EX parte Wall, lO7 U. S. 265, 288
(1883) ; Anderson v. Baker, 23 Md. 531, 6o7 (1865) ; Chase v. Blodgett, io N. H. 22, 29
(1838). But cf. In re Green, 49 P. (2d) 197 (Okla. 1935).
8. Weisel, J., in Anderson v. Baker, 23 Md. 531, 6o8 (1865).
9. State v. Candler, 3 Hawks 393 (N. C. 1824) ; State ex rel. Olson v. Langer, 256 N. W.
377 (N. D. 1934).
10. Sims v. Sims, 75 N. Y. 466 (1878) ; i GREENLEAF, EvIDENCE (16th ed. 1899) § 375; 1
WIGmoRE, EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923) § 521.
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conviction being inoperative except within the jurisdiction where rendered,
the disabilities consequent thereon are to be similarly limited. It will thus
be seen that there are two distinct lines of thought on this problem. The par-
ticular type of disability involved determines, to a large extent, which line of
reasoning is applied, and consequently whether the criminal conviction will
or will not be given extraterritorial effect.
At common law a person was incompetent as a witness if he had been
convicted of an infamous crime. 1 In 1822 it was decided in the case of
Commonwealth v. Green 12 that a conviction in another state did not dis-
qualify a witness in Massachusetts. The court based its decision upon (i) the
principle that penal laws have no extraterritorial effect, (2) the difficulty of
authenticating the record of the foreign judgment, (3) the variation of defi-
nitions of specific crimes in different jurisdictions, and (4) the difficulty of
obtaining a pardon after the convicted man leaves his former state of domicile.
This case has been followed in the majority of jurisdictions, 13 although
there is contrary authority.' 4  Where the disability has been enacted into
statute, the common law majority rule is followed,' 5 unless the statute spe-
cifically provides otherwise. 6
In attempting to evaluate the doctrine of Commonwealth v. Green it is
well to bear in mind that the old common law disqualification was likely to
result in injury to innocent parties. It was never popular with the judiciary,' 7
nor with the modern textwriters,'8 and'has been largely abrogated by stat-
ute. 19 It is therefore natural that courts limit its application whenever pos-
sible.
20
Those jurisdictions which adhere to the rule of Commonwealth v.
Green have the further question to face: should 'the foreign conviction be
admitted into evidence for the purpose of impeaching the witness? Some
ii. Pendock d. Mackender v. Mackender, 2 Wils. 18 (1755); 1 GRmE.NLAF, EViDENCE
(i6th ed. 1899) § 372; 5 JONES, EVIDENcE (2d ed. 1926) § 2096; I WIGMoRF, EVIDENCE (2d
ed. 1923) § 519.
12. 17 Mass. 515 (1822).
13. Logan v. United States, 144 U. S. 263 (1892) ; Langdon v. Evans, 3 Mackey I (D. C.
1883); I GRE1iA, EVIDENC (16th ed. 1899) § 376; 5 JONES, EvIDENE (2d ed. 1926)
§2098; I WIG1oRE, EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923) § 522; Notes L. R. A. 1917A 1138; (1907) 5
ANN. CAS. 917.
It is doubtful whether a party may deliberately take advantage of this rule in a suit upon
a transitory cause of action. In Weaver v. Alabama Southern R. R., 20o Ala. 432, 435, 76
So. 364, 367 (917), Sommerville, J., said: ". . . if the law of Georgia, contrary to the
law of Alabama, disqualified from testifying the only witness by whom complainant could
establish its defense, respondent's resort to a Georgia court, in order to suppress the testi-
mony of that witness, would be . . . unfair, and the result . . . perversive of jus-
tice.
14. State v. Foley, I5 Nev. 64 (188o) ; Chase v. Blodgett, io N. H. 22 (1838) ; State v.
Candler, 3 Hawks 393 (N. C. 1824).
15. State v. Landrum, 127 Mo. App. 653, io6 S. W. iiii (19o8); Weber v. State, 18
Okla. Cr. 421, 195 Pac. 510 (1921); Samuels v. Commonwealth, iio Va. gol, 66 S. E. 222
(i9o9) ; Note L. R. A. 1917A 1138, 1145.
16. Pitner v. State, 23 Tex. App. 366, 5 S. W. 210 (1887).
17. Mitchell, J., speaking fori the court in Diehl v. Rodgers, 16p Pa. 316, 324, 32 Atl.
424, 427 (1895) said: "Suppose Lindsay was the only witness to a murder, must justice be
baffled because of his disability?" See also the opinion of Clarke, J., in Rosen v. United
States. 245 U. S. 467 (1918) at p. 471.
18. APPLETON, EViDENCE (i86o) 30-40; I GREENiEAF, EVIDENCE (16th ed. 1899) § 378a;
5 JONES, EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1926) § 2101; I WrGmoRE, EvDENCE (2d ed. 1923) § 519.
ig. E. g., KAN. REV. STAT. ANN. (1923) § 62-1424; Mo. STAT. ANN. (1932) tit. 6, c. 8,
§ 1752; N. Y. PENAL LAW (1916) §2444; 6 & 7 VIcT., c. 85 (1843).
20. See (1935) 48 HARV. L. REV. 687.
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courts permit this,2 1 but hold that the conviction is not conclusive as to the
guilt of the witness.22  Others exclude entirely any evidence of the convic-
tion.2 3  Since the record of conviction is 'evidence of the commission of a
particular crime, it would seem that the latter view is more consistent with
the rule of evidence that the character of a witness 'for truth can be im-
peached by general evidence only.24  Moreover, permitting the introduction
of the record while denying its conclusive effect permits the injection of a
collateral issue of fact, i. e., whether the witness was or was not guilty of
the crime for which he was convicted in the foreign state.
Likewise, at common law, a juror could be challenged for cause if he
had been convicted of an infamous crime.2 5 In line with the cases concern-
ing witnesses, there is some authority that conviction in a foreign state does
not disqualify a juror.20  But the majority of cases are contra.2 7  These
decisions may be explained by the self-evident fact that an act is no less in-
famous because it 'was committed across the state border. Exclusion of a
juror does not hamper innocent parties, which may explain why courts are
more likely to give extraterritorial effect to foreign convictions when jurors
are involved, than when the 'disability is attempted to be imposed upon a
prospective witness.
Quite different considerations obtain when courts construe statutes
providing that attorneys either may or must be disbarred for conviction of
a felony. Almost universally, conviction of a felony in a foreign jurisdic-
tion is held to be within the purview of such statutes,28 although a micro-
scopic minority dissents. 29  Also, failure of a prospective attorney, when
applying for admission to the bar, to disclose a previous conviction in an-
other state is held to constitute fraud for which his license to practice 'may
be revoked.30 It would appear that the prospect of permitting a convict to
practice law has forced the judiciary to rebel against the doctrine of the
strictly local effect of criminal convictions. In support of this position, the
courts are bolstered by their "inherent" power to disbar for misconduct,
wherever perpetrated. 3 '
21. Commonwealth v. Knapp, 9 Pick. 496 (Mass. 183o) ; State v. March, i Jones L. 526
(N. C. 1854).
22. Sims v. Sims, 75 N. Y. 466 (1878).
23. Missouri, etc., Ry. v. De Bord & Lakey, 21 Tex. Civ. App. 69I, 53 S. W. 587 (1899);
Uhl v. Commonwealth, 6 Grat. 7o6 (Va. 1849).
24. See Chase v. Blodgett, io N. H. 22, 24 (1838).
25. 3 Br. Comm. *363.
26. Queenan v. Territory of Oklahoma, ii Okla. 261, 71 Pac. 218 (1901), aff'd, 19o U. S.
548 (1903).
27. Amaya v. State, 87 Tex. Cr. App. 16o, 22o S. W. 98 (1920) ; Hughes v. State, IO5
Tex. Cr. App. 57, 284 S. W. 952 (1926).
28. See authorities collected in State ex tel. San~ford v. Riddle, 213 Ala. 430, 105 So.
259 (925) ; Notes (1932) 79 A. L. R. 38; (91o) 17 AxN. CAs. 599; (igog) ig L. R. A.
(N. s.) 892.
29. In re Ebbs, i5o N. C. 44, 63 S. E. i9o (19o8) ; cf. Ex parte Quarrier, 2 W. Va. 569
(1866).
30. its re Mash, 28 Cal. App. 692, 153 Pac. g6i (915) ; People ex tel. Deneen v. Gil-
more, 214 Ill. 569, 73 N. E. 737 (1905).
31. Ex parte Wall, 107 U. S. 265 (1883) ; Wernimont v. State ex i-el. Little Rock Bar
Ass'n, ioi Ark. 21o, 142 S. W. 194 (1911); In re Simpson, 9 N. D. 379, 83 N. W. 541
(19oo) ; lit re Egan, 22 S. D. 355, 117 N. W. 874 (19o8) ; State ex rel. Hardin v. Grover, 47
Wash. 39, 91 Pac. 564 (i9o7).
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A similar rule has been adopted in respect to statutes,8 2 permitting
revocation of the license of a physician or surgeon for conviction of crime.
3 3
In this situation, the interest of the public is extremely vital, and the state in
the exercise of its police power may fortify and protect its citizens.34
Several cases have held that where a statute in general terms ex-
cludes from the office of executor anyone convicted of crime, it does not
exclude those convicted of crime in other jurisdictions. 35 These decisions
cite Commonwealth v. Green with approval, and follow the reasoning of that
authority, at the same time distinguishing the disbarment proceedings as
cases which require different treatment.
Conviction of crime was not a ground for divorce at common law,36 but
has been made so by statute in most states.37 However, conviction outside
the state is not a cause for divorce, 38 unless otherwise expressed in the
statute.39 This is in accord with the well known dogma that statutes in
derogation of the common law must be strictly construed.
In one case,40 a statute provided that no person convicted of having
taken the life of another may inherit from such person. Complainant
caused the death of her husband in another state, and was there convicted of
the crime. The court permitted complainant to inherit from her husband,
holding that the statute, being penal in nature, 41 applies only to conviction
within the state. This extreme decision is the only case found involving
such a factual situation. It is all the more surprising when it is realized
that, without the aid of a statute, some courts deny recovery to the killer,42
or at least construct a trust upon the decedent's property coming into the
32. A collection of such statutes will be found in the footnotes to Hawker v. New York,
170 U. S. I89 (I898).
33. White v. Andrew, 70 Colo. 50, 197 Pac. 564 (1921) ; Seitz v. Ohio State Medical
Board, 24 Ohio App. 154, 157 N. E. 3o4 (1926) ; see State Board of Medical Examiners v.
Friedman, 15o Tenn. 152, i8o, 263 S. W. 75, 83 (923).
34. Meffert v. State Board of Medical Registration, 66 Kan. 710, 72 Pac. 247 (19o3),
aff'd, 195 U. S. 625 (1904) ; Lawrence v. Board of Registration, 239 Mass; 424, i32 N. E.
174 (1921).
35. Garitee v. Bond, 1O2 Md. 379, 62 Atl. 631 (1905) ; In re Canter's Estate, 146 Misc.
123, 261 N. Y. Supp. 872 (Surr. Ct. 1933).
36. Note (1896) 31 L. R. A. 515.
37. For a collection of statutory provisions, see Notes (1896) 31 L. R. A. 515; 65 Am.
Dec. 708.
38. Leonard v. Leonard, 15I Mass. 151, 23 N. E. 732 (189o) ; Martin v. Martin, 47 N. H.
52 (1866) ; Klutts v. Klutts, 5 Sneed 423 (Tenn. 1858); I BisHoP, MARIAG4 & DIvoRcE
(6th ed. 1881) § 823; Note (1896) 31 L. R. A. 515, 519. But see Johnson v. Johnson, I
Walk. Ch. 309, 312 (Mich. 1843).
39. E. g., PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 193o) tit. 23, § io (h). For construction of this
type of statute, see Frantz v. Frantz, ii Pa. Co. 467 (1892) (divorce denied) ; Singleton v.
Singleton, 24 Pa. Dist. 667 (1914) (divorce granted) ; BossARD, DIvORcE IN PENNSYLVANIA
(1922) 93.
40. Harrison v. Moncravie, 264 Fed. 776 (C. C. A. 8th, 192o), appeal dismissed, 255
U. S. 562 (1921).
41. Such a statute is not generally considered as penal. Price v. Hitaffer, 164 Md. 505,
165 Atl. 470 (I933) ; Perry v. Strawbridge, 2o9 Mo. 621, io8 S. W. 641 (19o8); Box v.
Lanier, 112 Tenn. 393, 79 S. W. 1042 (1903). Contra: Wall v. Pfanschmidt, 265; Ill. i8o,
io6 N. E. 785 (1914) semble; Kuhn v. Kuhn, 125 Iowa 449, IOI N. W. 151 (1904) ; Owens
v. Owens, OO N. C. 240, 6 S. E. 794 (1887) semble.
42. Perry v. Strawbridge, 2o9 Mo. 621, io8 S. W. 641 (19o8) ; Shellenberger v. Ran-
som, 31 Neb. 6I, 47 N. W. 700 (18gi); Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N. Y. 5o6, 22 N. E. 188
(1889) ; Box v. Lanier, 112 Tenn. 393, 79 S. W. 1042 (1903). Contra: McAllister v. Fair,
72 Kan. 533, 84 Pac. 112 (19o6); Owens v. Owens, IOO N. C. 24o, 6 S. E. 794 (1887);
Carpenter's Estate, 170 Pa. 203, 32 AtI. 637 (1895).
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killer's hands by reason of the homicide,4 3 no matter where the homicide
occurred.
In another case,44 a police pension fund had been established, and the
rules disqualified from participation therein any police officer discharged
for conviction of a felony. Relator was convicted of a felony in another
jurisdiction, and discharged from the police force. The pension trustees
refused to permit him to participate in the fund, and he instituted a man-
damus action. The court denied the writ, saying: "Certainly it [the rule]
has reference to the conviction of a felony in any jurisdiction. . . . , 45
Most states, either by constitution or statute, exclude from suffrage
those convicted of certain serious offenses. Although no direct holding has
been found, there are several dicta 46 to the effect that conviction of felony
in another jurisdiction works a disability, unless the statute can reasonably
be construed to provide otherwise.4 7 It has been suggested that disqualifi-
cation as to voting is a purely internal matter,48 but these expressions gave
no recognition to that argument.
The closely related problem of the effect of a foreign conviction upon
eligibility to hold public office has given the courts some difficulty. One early
case declared, by way of dictum, that conviction of crime in a foreign juris-
diction did not disqualify an alderman under a statute which provided that
those convicted of crime were ineligible to hold office; 49 another left the
question open.50 But since i9oo all the cases, 51 with two exceptions,5 2 have
gone the other way. These more recent decisions are in line with the pur-
pose of the disqualification-that only those fit to be trusted should hold
public office 5 3 -and it matters little where the conviction occurred. They
run counter, however, to the proposition that disqualifying statutes should
be strictly construed.5
4
43. Sherman v. Weber, 113 N. J. Eq. 451, 167 AtI. 517 (933); (933) 82 U. OF PA. L.
REv. 183; Bryant v. Bryant, 193 N. C. 372, 137 S. E. 188 (1927).
44. State ex rel. Beckman v. Bowman, 38 Ohio App. 237, 175 N. E. 891 (193o).
45. Id. at p. 242, 175 N. E. at 892. In State ex rel. Little v. Selby, 22 Ohio Law Rep. 410
(1924), it had been determined that the trustees of the police relief fund have discretion
which is not subject to judicial review. However, it is extremely doubtful whiether this fact
influenced the decision in the Bowman case.
46. See United States v. Barnabo, Fed. Cas. No. 14,522, at ioo8 (S. D. N. Y. 1876);
Cowan v. Prowse, 93 Ky. 156, 171, 19 S. W. 407, 411 (1892) ; Jones v. Board of Registrars,
56 Miss. 766, 770 (1879).
47. United States v. Barnabo, Fed. Cas. No. 14,522 (S. D. N. Y. 1876).
48. See (1935) 2 U. OF Cni. L. REV. 333, 334.
49. See Hildreth v. Heath, I Ill. App. 82, 87 (1878) ; cf. State v. Du Bois, 88 Tenn. 753,
13 S. W. io88 (i8go).
5o. Gandy v. State, io Neb. 243, 4 N. W. IOI9 (188o).
51. Irby v. Day, 182 Ark. 595, 32 S. W. (2d) 157 (193o) ; State ex rel. Attorney Gen-
eral v. Irby, 81 S. W. (2d)' 419 (Ark. 1935) ; State v. Redman, 183 Ind. 332, 1O9 N. E. 184
(1915) ; Crampton v. O'Mara, 193 Ind. 551, 139 N. E. 360 (1923), writ of error denied, 267
U. S. 575 (1925) ; State ex rte. Anderson v. Fousek, 91 Mont. 448, 8 P. (2d) 791 (1932) ;
State ex rel. Olson v. Langer, 256 N. W. 377 (N. D. 1934) ; State ex rel. Salisbury v. Vogel,
256 N. W. 404 (N. D. 1934).
52. People ex rel. Barnett v. Bartlett, 169 Ill. App. 304 (1912) ; State ex rel. Mitchell
v. McDonald, 164 Miss. 405, 145 So. 508 (1933).
53. See State v. Redman, 183 Ind. 332, 340, 109 N. E. 184, 187 (1915) ; State ex reL
Olson v. Langer, 256 N. W. 377, 385 (N. D. 1934) (1935) 83 U. OF PA. L. REV. 386, 387;
(1935) 48 HARV. L. REV. 687; (1935) 49 HARv. L. REv. 157, 158.
54. See State v. Gooding, 22 Idaho 128, 132, 124 Pac. 791, 792 (1912) ; People ex reL
Barnett v. Bartlett, 169 Ill. App. 304, 306 (1912).
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Besides the factual situations already mentioned, there are several
which are more closely related to the criminal law, in which the extent of a
criminal's punishment may be affected by a foreign conviction. In one
case, 5 5 a statute provided that suspended sentences could be set aside upon
conviction of the defendant of another felony. It was held that defendant's
suspended sentence could be set aside because he had been convicted of a
felony in another jurisdiction. In another case, 56 defendant's sentence was
commuted upon the condition that, if he should thereafter be "convicted of
any felony," he should be deemed an escaped convict. Defendant was later
convicted of a felony in another state. After distinguishing a case involv-
ing the effect of a foreign conviction upon a witness's competency, the court,
by way of dictum, expressed its belief that the foreign conviction was in-
cluded within the phrase "convicted of any felony", and Pound, J., said:
"Good behavior, although determined to some extent by local standards, is
not a matter of geography. . . ." 57 What these decisions actually did was
to look to the spirit, rather than the letter, of the law, in order that the cul-
prit should not escape his just punishment. The court's sympathy for the
defendant is considerably mitigated in these cases by the fact that there is
involved a second offense. It is submitted that the statutes here involved
were more penal in nature than, for example, those excluding from the
office of executor anyone convicted of crime. Yet in the latter situation,58
the same court permitted a man convicted in another jurisdiction to escape
the disqualification prescribed in the statute, on the grounds that penal laws
have no extraterritorial effect.
A somewhat similar problem arose as to the interpretation of the
Baumes law,sa which provided a heavier penalty for a convict previously
convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment in a state prison. Was this
meant to embrace previous convictions elsewhere? Such a situation pre-
sented itself, but the court expressly reserved the question.59 In the mean-
time, the penal law had been amended, so that the problem has now become
purely academic. Thus today there is no doubt that under the express pro-
visions of so-called multiple conviction statutes, foreign convictions are
given extraterritorial effect. 60 Similarly, a statute granting indeterminate
sentences to persons "never before convicted of a crime punishable by im-
prisonment in a state prison" has been held not to entitle to an indeterminate
sentence one who was previously convicted in another state. 61- The court
relied upon a section of the same statute which directed all its provisions to
be construed "according to the fair import of their terms to promote justice
and effect the objects of the law."
An important question arises when the two jurisdictions involved are
state and federal. It has been held in some instances that state and federal
55. Brown v. State, 105 Tex. Cr. App. 586, 289 S. W. 682 (1926).
56. People ex reL. Atkins v. Jennings, 248 N. Y. 46, 161 N. E. 326 (1928).
57. Id. at 52, 161 N. E. at 328.
58. See supra, p. 216.
58a. N. Y. PExA LAw §§ 1941-1943.
59. People v. Guttersohn, 244 N. Y. 243, 155 N. E. 113 (1926) ; cf. People v. Caesar, I
Park. Cr. 645 (N. Y. 1855).
6o. People v. Wood, 145 Misc. 678, 261 N. Y. Supp. 89-2 (County Ct. Saratoga County
1932) ; State v. Malusky, 59 N. D. 501, 23o N. W. 735 (930).
61. People ex rel. Murray v. Becker, 78 Misc. 666, 138 N. Y. Supp. 771 (Sup. Ct.
1912).
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courts are foreign to each other in the same sense that the courts of two
states are foreign, because they derive their jurisdiction from different gov-
ernments, and the fact that both courts enjoy the same territorial jurisdic-
tion is immaterial. 62 So distinct are the two sovereignties, that an act
denounced as a crime by both is an offense against both, and may be pun-
ished by each. 63  Logically, therefore, a conviction in the federal courts
should be treated by the state courts as a foreign conviction, and the same
attitude should be adopted by federal courts in respect to convictions in state
courts. And in fact the particular rule governing foreign convictions is
almost invariably applied to federal convictions by state courts.64 An extreme
example is Ex parte Quarrier.63 In that case, the court admitted to the bar a
man who had participated in rebellion against the United States, on the
ground that this did not constitute an offense against the state.
On the other hand, an offense against federal law is an offense against
the "supreme law of the land" 66 and a few state decisions have balked at
treating a federal conviction as if it were rendered by a foreign court. 67  In
one of these, an attorney who had been convicted by a federal court was dis-
barred, but the court limited this rule to convictions by federal courts sitting
in the same state.68 And in at least one constitution, federal convictions are
placed upon the same basis as convictions in the courts of the state. 69
As has been already observed,70 a foreign conviction does not disqualify
a witness, and it follows that conviction in a federal court does not disqualify
a witness in a state court.71 This is true although both state and federal
statutes prohibit a convict from testifying,72 because "neither the State
statute nor the Federal statute . . could impose the punishment im-
posed by the other, nor can the courts of either take cognizance of or punish
violations of the statutes of the other.. ." 73
It remains to examine the effect of a conviction in a state court upon
the competency of a witness in federal tribunals. Despite the rule that the
federal courts are governed by the rules of evidence of the state in which
62. Goldey v. Morning News, 156 U. S. 518 (i895) ; Brown v. United States, 233 Fed.
353 (C. C. A. 6th, i916).
63. Moore v. Illinois, 14 How. 13 (U. S. 1852) ; United States v. Lanza, 26o U. S. 377
(1922).
64. E. g., Barnes v. District Court, 178 Cal. 500, 173 Pac. noo (i918) ; In re Kerl, 32
Idaho 737, 188 Pac. 40 (i92o) ; Leonard v. Leonard, 15, Mass. I51, 23 N. E. 732 (189o);
State ex rel. Anderson v. Fousek, 91 Mont. 448, 8 P. (2d) 791 (1932); In re Canter's
Estate, 146 Misc. 123, 261 N. Y. Supp. 872 (Surr. Ct. 1933); Amaya v. State, 87 Tex. Cr.
I60, 220 S. W. 98 (1920).
65. 2 W. Va. 569 (1866). Although there was no conviction involved, the case is an
excellent illustration of the attitude of a state court toward violation of federal law.
66. U. S. CoNsT. Art. VI, § 2.
67. See United States v. Barefield, 23 Fed. 136, 137 (E. D. Tex. 1885) ; State ex tel.
Sanford v. Riddle, 213 Ala. 430, 433, 105 So. 259, 262 (1925) ; State ex tel. Olson v. Langer,
256 N. W. 377, 387 (N. D. 1934). -
68. State ex tel. Sanford v. Riddle, 213 Ala. 430, 105 So. 259 (1925).
69. Na. CoxsT. art. VI, § 2.
70. Supra, p. 214.'
71. See i BIsHoP, CRmrNAI. LAw (9th ed. 1923) § 976; Note L. R. A. I917A 1138,
1143.
72. Samuels v. Commonwealth, Iio Va. 9Ol, 66 S. E. 222 (igog); I'ain v. Angle, iii
Va. 415, 69 S. E. 355 (I9Io).
73. Cardwell, J., in Samuels v. Commonwealth, iio Va. 9O1, 903, 66 S. E. 222, 223
(9o9).
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they are sitting,74 conviction in a state court does not generally disqualify a
witness in federal courts,7" although clearly he would not be competent in
the state courts. These decisions, no doubt, are attributable to "the tendency
of modern thought towards the abolition of archaic rules which arbitrarily
debarred certain classes from testifying," 7 despite the interest of litigants
in having the testimony of all acquainted with the facts, an interest which
exists even though the witness's credibility may be impaired by anti-social
conduct.
This tendency is so strong that although a federal statute renders a
witness incompetent who has been convicted of crime, it has been held that
even a conviction in federal courts will not disqualify a witness in federal
courts.7 7 This result was achieved by relying upon the removal of such dis-
ability by the law of the state in which the federal court was sitting, and re-
iteration of the rule that, as to procedure, federal courts follow the rules of
the state in which they sit. Thus, through divers direct and indirect means,
the federal courts have so limited the effect of a conviction, whether in a
state or federal court, that one judge was led to remark: ". . . the com-
mon law rule [as to the incompetency of a convict to testify] does not obtain
in federal courts. . , 78
When the law of the forum differs from that of the state of conviction,
serious difficulties may arise in the application of the foregoing rules. Of
course, when it has been decided that a foreign conviction can have no extra-
territorial effect by way of disabilities, the variation of the criminal law
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction presents no difficulty; in fact, the desire to
dodge the conflicts question has been given as a reason for so deciding.79
But this problem has considerably embarrassed courts in cases where, because
of either statute or previous decision, foreign convictions may work a dis-
ability. For example, suppose a statute of the forum disqualifies anyone
"convicted of felony, either within or without this state." If one is con-
victed of an act which is a felony in the state where the conviction is ren-
dered, whether or not he is under a disability mentioned in the hypothetical
statute may depend upon whether the same act, if committed within the
forum, would have been, under the law of the forum, a felony, no crime
whatever, or a misdemeanor. On the basis of these three possibilities, the
cases and statutes may be roughly divided into three classifications.
The first group of decisions, which probably represents the majority,
gives effect to the foreign conviction of felony, provided that the act com-
mitted also constitutes a felony in the forum. 0 But farther than this it re-
74. United States v. Reid, 12 How. 361 (U. S. 185i) ; 34 STAT. 618 (I9o6), 28 U. S. C.
A. § 631 (1928) ; 6 HUGHES, FEDERAL PiAcrIcE (I93I) § 3605.
75. Logan v. United States, i44 U. S. 263 (892); Rosen v. United States, 245 U. S.
467 (1918) ; Pakas v. United States, 245 U. S. 467 (918) ; Brown v. United States, 233
Fed. 353 (C. C. A. 6th, 1916); 6 HUGHES, FEDERAL PRACncF_ (I93I) §3606n. Contra:
United States v. Barefield, 23 Fed. 136 (E. D. Tex. 1885).
76. i BISHOP, CRIMiNAL LAw (9th ed. 1923) § 976.
77. Wise v. Williams, 162 Fed. i6I (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 9o8) ; McCoy v. United States,
247 Fed. 86r (C. C. A. 5th, 1918) ; Hagan v. United States, 9 F. (2d) 562 (C. C. A. 8th,
125).
78. Lewis, J., in Hurwitz v. United States, 299 Fed. 449, 453 (C. C. A. 8th, 1924).
79. See supra, p. 214.
8o. Chase v. Blodgett, io N. H. 22 (1838) ; State v. Malusky, 59 N. D. 5o, 23o N. W.
735 (1930) ; Pitner v. State, 23 Tex. App. 366, 5 S. W. 210 (887).
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fuses to go, and if the act is not a felony as defined by the laws of the forum,
although it may be a felony in the state which rendered the conviction, it
can have no effect.81 This method of treatment has been incorporated into
a few statutes.8 2  It supplies an easily applied rule of thumb, and makes all
disabilities depend solely upon local law. In applying this rule it has been
held that, in order to give effect to the foreign conviction, there must be
affirmative proof that the act upon which the conviction was based, if com-
mitted within the forum, would constitute a felony under the laws of the
forum.8 3  In its operation, this rule has produced some slightly unpalatable
results. For example, a New York court refused to give effect to a Michi-
gan conviction of larceny and sentence of two to five years, on the ground
that the act might only have constituted a misdemeanor in New York.
4
The second group of decisions is well illustrated by State ex rel. Olson
v. Langer.85  In that case, the North Dakota constitution excluded from
public office anyone convicted of felony. The Governor was convicted in a
federal court of conspiracy, which is a felony under federal law, but only a
misdemeanor under the law of North Dakota. Quo warranto proceedings
were then instituted against him and were successful. The opinion written
by Judge Burke stated: ". . . whether an offense for which a conviction is
had is a felony must be determined by the law of the jurisdiction where it is
committed." 86 A number of decisions have handled the problem in an iden-
tical fashion.8't In disbarment proceedings, the convicted attorney is invari-
ably held to be under a disability upon the bare showing that the act which
he committed was a felony in the jurisdiction in which he committed it.88
Thus, the approach adopted by these cases also furnishes a convenient rule
of thumb, but completely disregards the law of the forum. It has been
doubted whether it would be adhered to if an extreme situation were pre-
sented. 9
Between these two extremes is a small group of cases which adopts an
intermediate view. They hold that a conviction of felony in a foreign juris-
diction imposes a disability if the same act is an offense punishable by the
laws of the forum, whether a felony or a misdemeanor.90 But they refuse
to give effect to a foreign conviction of felony if the act committed consti-
Si. People ex -el. Atldns v. Jennings, 248 N. Y. 46, 161 N. E. 326 (1928) ; People v.
Davis, 141 Misc. 897, 253 N. Y. Supp. 511 (Ct. Gen. Sess. N. Y. Co. 1931); People v.
Wood, 145 Misc. 678, 261 N. Y. Supp. 89z (Co. Ct. Saratoga Co. 1932) ; Frantz v. Frantz,
ii Pa. Co. 467 (1892) ; Goldstein v. State, 75 Tex. Cr. App. 390, 171 S. W. 709 (1914).
82. E. g., N. Y. PENAL LAw (19o9) § 1941.
83. People v. Voelker, 220 App. Div. 528, 221 N. Y. Supp. 76o (4th Dep't 1927) ; People
v. Knox, 223 App. Div. 123, 227 N. Y. Supp. 417 (4th Dep't 1928) ; People v. Castellano, 228
App. Div. 670, 238 N. Y. Supp. 895 (2d Dep't 1929).
84. People ex rel. Atkins v. Jennings, 248 N. Y. 46, 161 N. E. 326 (1928).
85. 256 N. W. 377 (N. D. 1934).
86. Id. at p. 389.
87. State ex reL Anderson v. Fousek, gi Mont. 448, 8 P. (2d) 791 (1932) ; State ex rel.
Salisbury v. Vogel, 256 N. W. 404 (N. D. 1934) ; State ex tel. Beckman v. Bowman, 38 Ohio
App. 237, 175 N. E. 891 (1930); Brown v. State, I05 Tex. Cr. App. 586, 289 S. W. 682
(1926) semble.
88. In re Kerl, 32 Idaho 737, 188 Pac. 40 (1920) ; In re Minner, 133 Kan. 789, 3 P. (2d)
473 (193) ; Matter of Ackerson, 218 App. Div. 288, 218 N. Y. Supp. 654 (Ist Dep't 1926).
89. See (935) 83 U. OF PA. L. REV. 386, 387; (1935) 29 IT.t L. REv. 945, 947.
go. State ex rel. Sanford v. Riddle, 213 Ala. 430, 105 So. 259 (925) ; Matter of Comyns,
132 Wash. 391, 232 Pac. 269 0925) ; see Ex parte Biggs, 52 Ore. 433, 435, 97 Pac. 713, 714
(19o8).
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tutes no crime under the law of the forum.9 1 At least one statute 92 has em-
bodied this principle. It is interesting to note that had the Supreme Court
of North Dakota utilized such a method of reasoning in the Langer case,
the same result would have there been achieved. Under this view there is
danger that convictions in the federal courts of crimes which are, by their
very nature, exclusively crimes against the national government, 93 may be
considered as ineffectual to disqualify in a state court. 94 But when such a
situation arises, courts are alert to find that a crime under state law was
actually committed, although perpetrated in such a manner or through such
an agency that a violation of federal law was incidentally involved.95
Whenever a statute disqualifies for conviction of a crime "involving
moral turpitude", the necessity for examining the difference between the
laws of the forum and the state in which conviction occurs disappears. Un-
der such a statute it is immaterial what differences, if any, exist. The courts
decide whether the offense is one "involving moral turpitude", and if it is,
the disability attaches. 96 Of course, in determining this question, local
standards are applied, although the act was commited elsewhere.
Usually, it is considered immaterial whether or not the law of the state
where the conviction occurred imposes disabilities similar to those existing
in the forum.97 That fact is treated as being foreign to the issue as to
whether or not the foreign conviction shall be given extraterritorial effect,
and apparently correctly so. But at least one case points out that the state
of conviction imposed no disqualification upon a witness because of criminal
conviction, and upon this ground decides that the foreign conviction was
ineffectual to render a witness incompetent.
98
Conclusion
It can readily be seen that the basic rule laid down by Chief Justice
Marshall,9 9 that courts of one country will not execute the penal laws of an-
other, is not helpful in determining the extraterritorial effect of criminal
convictions in all cases. This results from the great confusion existing as to
what constitutes a "penal law." 100 The only manner in which order can be
gi. People v. Guttersohn, 244 N. Y. 243, 155 N. E. 113 (1926) ; Ex parte Biggs, 52 Ore.
433, 97 Pac. 713 (19o8) ; see (1935) 83 U. OF PA. L. REv. 386, 387.
92. ONTARIO REV. STAT. 1887, C. 148, § 34.
93. Such as using the mails to defraud, interstate traffic in women for immoral pur-
poses, etc.
94. People v. Guttersohn, 244 N. Y. 243, 155 N. E. 113 (1926).
95. State ex rel. Sanford v. Riddle, 213 Ala. 430, 105 So. 259 (1925) ; Matter of Comyns,.
132 Wash. 391, 232 Pac. 269 (1925).
96. Barnes v. District Court, 178 Cal. 500, 173 Pac. noo (1918) ; In re O'Connell, 184
Cal. 584, 194 Pac. IOlO (192o) ; White v. Andrew, 70 Colo. 50, 197 Pac. 564 (1921) ; Matter
of Hopkins, 54 Wash. 569, 1O3 Pac. 805 (1909) ; Matter of Finch, 156 Wash. 609, 287 Pac.
677 (1930).
97. See Harrison v. Moncravie, 264 Fed. 776, 783 (C. C. A. 8th, I92O), appeal dismissed,
255 U. S. 562 (1921).
98. Langdon v. Evans, 14 Dist. Col. i (1883).
99. Supra, p. 213.
ioo. There is even confusion among the decisions of a particular jurisdiction, e. g., New
York. Compare Sims v. Sims, 75 N. Y. 466 (1878) and In re Canter's Estate, 146 Misc. 123,
261 N. Y. Supp. 872 (Surr. Ct. 1933) with Matter of Lindheim, 195 App. Div. 827, 189 N. Y.
Supp. 211 (Ist Dep't 1921) and People ex rel. Atkins v. Jennings, 248 N. Y. 46, 161 N. E.
326 (1928).
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produced out of the chaos is to classify the cases according to their facts,
and then to determine under what circumstances courts will give effect to
foreign convictions. A study of the decisions and statutes indicates that,
although originally the provincial attitude was strictly adhered to, the recent
trend apparently is to give effect to criminal convictions without regard to
where the conviction was had.
There is also a tendency to give federal convictions the same weight as
convictions obtained in the forum, while at the same time the courts do lip
service to the theory that federal courts and state courts are foreign to one
another.
As to how to treat differences in the law of the forum and the state of
conviction, the objective is to reach a solution which will result in a mini-
mum of injustice. 01' The two major groups of decisions are too extreme,
one placing too strict, and the other too loose a construction upon disqualify-
ing statutes. The "moral turpitude" treatment is applicable to only a par-
ticular type of statute. Moreover, "moral turpitude" is so vague a term,
varying according to time and locality, that it is not very helpful and ham-
pers uniformity. 01 The most practical solution seems to be the interme-
diate view of disregarding the arbitrary 103 distinction between felonies and
misdemeanors. If effect is given to a foreign conviction of felony only
when the crime is also punishable under the laws of the forum, whether as a
felony or misdemeanor, a rule is laid down which is definite, and which
takes into consideration both the law of the forum and the law of the state
of conviction.
Finally, it can be seen that the problem of the extraterritorial effect of
criminal convictions is largely a matter of statutory construction. Here, as
in so many other fields, much confusion and uncertainty could be eliminated
if statutes were more carefully drafted. It is to be hoped that in the future,
legislatures will evidence a more intelligent appreciation of the difficulties
which exist in this field.104
S. S. A., Jr.
Redefinition of Mortgage Deficiency
Much has been written recently regarding relief of the mortgage debtor.'
Most of this material has concerned itself with comparative analyses of
various methods of reaching the desired result. In view of the fact that the
legal problems arising from the application of each of these are distinct, this
ioi. See (1935) 29 ILL. L. REv. 945, 947.
io2. See United States ex rel. Mylius v. Uhl, 2o3 Fed. 152, 154 (S. D. N. Y. 1913);
Drazen v. New Haven Taxicab Co., 95 Conn. 500, 507, II1 At]. 861, 863 (920) ; EX parte
Mason, 29 Ore. I8, 23, 43 Pac. 651, 652 (i8_6) ; Beck v. Stitzel, 21 Pa. 522, 524 (1853) ; Note
(1929) 3 So. CAT. L. REV. 46, 49; Note (1929) 43 HAuv. L. REv. 117, 121; (1935) 83 U. OF
PA. L. REV. 386, 387.
1O3. See Ex parte Biggs, 52 Ore. 433, 435, 97 Pac. 713, 714 (o8) ; Lynch v. Common-
wealth, 88 Pa. 189, 192 (1878).
104. No attempt has been made in this study to examine the effect of either pardons or
pending appeals.
i. Feller, Moratory Legislation: A Comparative Study (1933) 46 HAgv. L. REv. io6i;
Note (1934) 82 U. OF PA. L. REV. 261; Note (933) 42 YALE L. J. 96o. For a thorough
case discussion see Langever v. Miller, 76 S. W. (2d) 1025 (Tex. Sup. Ct. 1934).
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note will be confined to a consideration of that method which a fast-growing
body of case law indicates may well be generally adopted in the future-
judicial and legislative redefinition of the amount of the deficiency remaining
payable by the mortgagor after foreclosure and sale of the mortgaged
premises.
What right has a creditor-mortgagee to any amount over and above the
actual proceeds realized at foreclosure sale? Not so many years ago such a
question would have been brushed aside as a fanciful attack upon the then
unquestioned rule of law that foreclosure and sale does not exhaust the
mortgagee's rights unless the proceeds entirely satisfy the debt. But the clash
of conflicting interests of debtor and creditor in times of social crisis fre-
quently necessitates an analytical re-examination of well-established legal
doctrines. And so this question has been put recently, challenging the old
upon its merits, suggesting that perhaps another rule might be economically
more justifiable.2  Consequently a prefatory paragraph in explanation and
justification of deficiency judgments is advisable.
At early common law, 0 the owner of Blackacre as the price of obtaining
a loan from A was required by the latter to give not merely a bond but also a
fee simple deed to Blackacre. From the moment of legal delivery of this
deed the mortgagee A was owner of the land and entitled to immediate pos-
session.3 Title was defeasible on due performance of the stipulated obliga-
tion but absolute on default. Where the value of Blackacre exceeded the
indebtedness, loss of the power to redeem was a palpable injustice to the
mortgagor and a contributing factor to the development of equity's jurisdic-
tion and of the lien mortgage.
Under either title or lien theory, the mortgage device in reality is his-
torically merely one method of providing security for the creditor's protec-
tion. It was in cases where the forced sale of the security, Blackacre, failed
to realize the face of the debt, that the legal device of deficiency judgment
was developed in order to safeguard the mortgagee. 4 Equity's original
solicitude for the oppressed mortgagor had been tempered by a growing
respect for the rights of the creditor-mortgagee.
Modern courts attempting to find reasons for the rule have frequently
paraphrased the rule itself by emphasizing the moral obligation of the mort-
gagor to pay what he owed.5 Seemingly this begs the question, since the
problem is whether the mortgagor should owe anything after the mortgagee
has seen fit to sell the security. However, there are more substantial bases
for the rule. Such sale does not in fact indicate an intention to discharge the
2. "We are confronted with a new theory to the effect that the mortgagor has a legal
right to completely settle a mortgage obligation by tendering to the mortgagee a deed to the
property mortgaged." Security Benefit Ass'n v. Swartz, 40 P. (2d) 433, 435 (Kan. 1935).
3. Cook v. Curtis, 125 Me. 114, 131 Atl. 204 (1925) ; Brown v. Cram, i N. H. 169
(1818). It is interesting to note that in Alabama even today this seems to be the rule. "The
mortgagor, before or after default, except by agreement, does not possess even the right of
possession as against the mortgagee." Mallory v. Agee, 226 Ala. 596, 6oo, 147 So. 881, 883
(1932).
4. 3 JONES, MORTGAGES (8th ed. 1928) § 2205; 2 WILTSE, MORTGAGE FoRFx.osuRE (4th
ed. 1927) § 949 et seq. See Amory v. Fairbanks, 3 Mass. 562 (1793).
5. It has been suggested, however, that the motives of the mortgagor should be taken into
account, and if he be found to be "speculating upon the return of prosperity" no relief should
be granted. Fifth Ave. Bank of N. Y. v. Compson, 113 N. J. Eq. 152, 166 Atl. 867 (1933).
Such an inquiry into the mental state of the parties would not seem practicable.
NOTES
debtor. Fundamentally, security is designed to increase and not to limit the
means of the creditor to realize the principal which it was given to secure.
In the face of these two grounds there seem to be no considerations of social
policy warranting a conclusive presumption that the parties had a contrary
intention. If there were such a presumption, creditors could adequately
protect themselves only by requiring so much security that the debtors would
in all probability be unable to produce it, thus "freezing" credit extension.
If the intent of the parties is, then, to be given effect, the mortgagee in
many cases may be regarded as justly entitled to recover more than has been
realized at foreclosure sale. The question is-how much more? The classic
method of determining this amount has been the automatic designation as
deficiency of the balance of the mortgage debt remaining unpaid after deduc-
tion of the proceeds of foreclosure (less costs, expenses, taxes and other
liens) from the mortgage debt.6 A factor undoubtedly looming large in the
original adoption of this means of measurement was its simplicity of arith-
metical computation. In periods of what might be called ordinary economic
stress, its application probably effected an equitable result in the majority of
cases, the mortgagee being assured of a return approximating the true value
of the foreclosed premises and the mortgagor a proportionately large scaling
down of the mortgage debt. Frequently this more or less normal demand
for the land on the part of potential purchasers was within the contemplation
of the parties upon execution of the mortgage.
Absence of criticism of the classic method in the past, however, has not
been due to its intrinsic virtues. Fundamentally it restates the conviction
that property sold at judicial sale is worth only what it brings-a wholly mis-
leading generality which does not distinguish between worth in the sense of
value and worth in the sense of price. Nothing has emphasized the fact of
the existence of this distinction more effectively than the tremendous list of
properties sold at sheriff's sale in any large city for ridiculously small sums.
The failure of the least realistic modern courts either to recognize this fact,
7
or recognizing it, to accord it legal significance,8 cannot conceal the inade-
quacy of the classic judicial sales device to safeguard the mortgagor both
today and in an appreciable minority of cases in the past. He loses the land
which is sold for next to nothing, and still remains personally obligated to the
mortgagee for practically the face of the bond.9 And where the mortgagee
is in fact the purchaser, as is generally the case, either in his own name or
through another, he profits to the extent that the value of the property exceeds
the price actually brought. Under such circumstances, foreclosure is not in
actuality a sale of security, but a speculative investment on the part of the
6. 3 JONES, op. Cit. supra note 4, at § 2219; 2 WmTsIm, op. cit. supra note 4, § 949 et seq.
7. In a typical case the court indicated that the fact that three sales had elicited no higher
offer than $27,6oo was substantial evidence against an affidavit that the land was really worth
$ioo,ooo. Merchants' Nat. Bank of Point Pleasant v. Ralphsnyder, 113 W. Va. 480, 486, 169
S. E. 89, 91 (1933).
8. "Mere inadequacy of consideration, however gross, unaccompanied by inequitable con-
duct, in connection with a judicial sale, is, of itself, insufficient to justify the court in setting
the sale aside and refusing confirmation thereof." Southern Grocery Co. v. Merchants Co.,
186 Ark. 615, 617, 54 S. W. (2d) 98o, 98I (1932).
9. New Jersey courts have been particularly prominent in pointing out this fact. Baader
v. Mascellino, 113 N. J. Eq. i89, 166 Atl. 466 (1933) ; Federal Title & Mortgage Guaranty
Co. v. Lowenstein, 113 N. J. Eq. 200, i66 At. 538 (1933). See also Langever v. Miller, 76
S. W. (2d) 1O25 (Tex. Sup. Ct. 1934).
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mortgagee-purchaser. It is little wonder, then, that recently courts and legis-
latures have recognized these defects arising from the rigidity of the classic
method, and have redefined deficiency to secure a flexibility achieving a nicer
balance of the equities between the parties, a balance that is not disturbed by
changing economic conditions.
Judicial Redefinition in the Absence of Statute
A few courts heretofore adhering to the classic method have found a
way recently to achieve a socially satisfactory result without benefit of statute.
Where the price brought is grossly inadequate, the decree of sale is not con-
firmed unless the mortgagee consents to an equitable means of measuring the
deficiency. 10
Since in the past refusal to confirm has been the exception rather than
the rule, some courts may consider it an embarrassing problem to square this
new method with lack of precedent. However there is general agreement
that courts have always had the power to refuse confirmation. 1 The past
practice simply indicates absence of sufficiently compelling circumstances.
Despite the majority view that the purchaser has no rights in the land until
confirmation, 12 a few comparatively recent cases indicate that even before
confirmation the purchaser is to be regarded as equitable owner.13 Possibly
courts holding the latter view will have more hesitancy in denying confirma-
tion than those purporting to interfere with no rights of the purchaser.
,One difficulty in the problem is the fact that much more has been said
than has been actually held. Thus, inadequacy of price, in itself, has been
repeatedly declared insufficient to bar confirmation. 1 4 Some additional factor,
1o. This is accomplished by any one of a variety of procedures. See iltfra notes 30-33
inclusive.
ii. "Until confirmation by the court the sale is incomplete. Confirmation is not a mere
formality, but is a judicial act although it is uncontested. The acceptance of the bid confers
no title on the puchaser, and not even any absolute right to have the purchase completed.
He is nothing more than a preferred bidder, or proposer for the purchase, subject to the
sanction of the court afterwards." 3 JONES, MoRGAGEs (8th ed. 1928) § 2103.
12. The purchaser has no vested right till confirmation. Layton v. Rhode Island Hos-
pital Trust Co., 205 Fed. 276 (C. C. A. 8th, Ark. 1913). "Both public and private sales-
under decrees of court are subject to the approval of the court, and, until ratified, any sale
is only an offer to purchase." Whitely v. Whitely, 117 Md. 538, 544, 84 Atl. 68, 70 (1912).
Upon confirmation, title is treated as having been in the purchaser from the day of sale.
Dixon v. Osborne, 204 N. C. 480, 168 S. E. 683 (1933) ; Watking v. French, 149 Okla. 205,
299 Pac. 900 (193).
13. "While some of the Kentucky cases ,following Hues v. Swope seem to cast doubt
upon the rule there announced, and while it has been indicated, as in Manhattan Insurance
Co. v. Stein and Zang, 5 Bush. (68 Ky.) 652, that it is the confirmation of the sale that de-
termines the effective transfer of ownership, it is, we think, clear, from an examination of
the later Kentucky cases, that the principle is now established that where at the time a sale
is made no valid ground for setting it aside exists, the accepted bidder is entitled to his pur-
chase, and is the equitable owner." Fidelity-Phoenix Fire Ins. Co. v. Hayward, 71 F. (2d)
834 (C. C. A. 6th, 1934). Whether or not one speaks in terms of "offer" and "ratification",
it seems clear that the majority of older cases conclude the purchaser is not the owner for all
purposes until confirmation.
14. ".... .. mere inadequacy of price is not per se sufficient to authorize a rejection of
sale by a court, unless it is so grossly sacrificial as to shock the conscience or create a pre-
sumption of fraud." Louisville Title Co. v. Ramsey, 79 S. W. (2d), 693, 694 (Ky. 1935).
In many states judicial sales made without irregularity or fraud, and not affected by acci-
dent or mistake, will not be-set aside for mere inadequacy of price. Hecht v. Hoogmoed, i1o
N. J. Eq. 163, 162 Atl. 873 (1932); Adams v. Spillyards, 187 Ark. 641, 61 S. W. (2d) 686
(1933).
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according to the rule, must be present. 15 The reports are replete with numer-
ous holdings and still more numerous dicta that laches may prevent confirma-
tion, as may fraud, misrepresentation, surprise, or mistake.16 Such state-
ments, of necessity, are meaningless when dissociated from the facts of the
individual case impelling the court to find sufficient legal basis for refusing
confirmation.
The basic aspects of the problem are well illustrated in Suring State Bank
v. Giese.1 Here the court declared that a price of $6oo on a $2ooo property,
when coupled with the presence of a financial emergency, justified the trial
judge in requiring the mortgagee to credit the debtor with the reasonable
value of the property, and in ordering a resale in the event of failure to do so.
It is worthy of note that the $2ooo valuation did not represent the then
market value of the premises."' Nor did it in actuality represent, as one
commentator suggests, 19 an estimate of potential market value. It is true that
the opinion did mention this factor. But the same court in the later case of
Kremer v. Rule 20 makes it clear that the valuation fundamentally reflected
the intrinsic worth of the land at the time of foreclosure sale, rather than
past or probable future price. 21  The result is emphasized by the fact that
the trial judge was reversed for considering the Suring case as sustaining the
standard of potential market value. The importance of the holding lies in
the reason given for refusing confirmation. Formerly the factor generally
insisted upon in addition to inadequacy of price was at least nominally some
element existing as between the parties at the time of entering into the trans-
action giving one an undue advantage over the other, or causing both to
labor under the same mistake of fact.22  It is true, of course, that courts
displayed considerable ingenuity in discovering the presence of such an addi-
tional factor where the price was in fact grossly inadequate. Nevertheless,
there has been an insistence upon its nominal presence, even though gross
inadequacy in itself has been considered some evidence of fraud, surprise or
mistake.23  To these the court in Suring State Bank v. Giese adds "state of
15. Holt v. Holt, 59 S. W. (2d) 324 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933) ; Speers Sand & Clay Works
v. American Trust Co., 52 F. (2d) 831 (C. C. A. 4th, 1931) ; Clegg v. Christensen, 346 II1.
314, 178 N. E. 925 (1932).
16. It re Pneumatic Tube Steam Splicer Co., 6o F. (2d) 524, 527 (D. Md. 1932) ; Hecht
v. Hoogmoed, Iio N. J. Eq. 163, 162 Ati. 873 (1932); Royal Highlanders v. Louthan, 123
Neb. 469, 243 N. W. 267 (1932). But see the cases cited infra note 29.
17. 210 Wis. 489, 246 N. W. 556 (1933), (1933) 81 U. OF PA. L. REV. 883; (1933) 42
YALE L. J. 961; (1933) 27 ILL. L. REV. 950; (1933) 33 COL. L. REv. 744.
18. Id. at 491, 246 N. W. at 557.
1g. See (1933) 27 ILL. L. REV. 950.
20. 216 Wis. 331, 257 N. W. 166 (1934).
21. Id. at 338, 339, 257 N. W. at 169. ". . . the [lower] court was evidently of the
opinion . . . that it could consider the market value of the premises which existed at some
remote time under conditions deemed by the court to be normal. There is nothing in the
Suring Case to justify that view . . . [the court] should not consider 'market value' as
that expression is ordinarily used and understood, much less the value that the premises may
have had at .some remote time or may have in the future. . . . It should direct its atten-
tion to the matter of determining the real value [italics added] of the premises as of the time
of the foreclosure sale."
22. Holt v. Holt, 59 S. W. (2d) 324 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933) ; Clegg v. Christensen, 346
Ill. 314, 178 N. E. 925 (1932).
23. In re Yost & Cook, 7o F. (2d) 614 (C. C. A. 6th, 1934) ; Schroeder v. Annapolis &
Chesapeake Bay Power Co., 2 F. Supp. 394 (D. Md. 1933) ; Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v.
Heany, 122 Neb. 747, 749, 241 N. W. 525, 526 (1932). Cf. Lamb v. Kelley, 97 W. Va. 409,
125 S. E. 102 (1924). Obviously the "presumption" of fraut arising from "gross" inade-
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the times", of which it takes judicial notice, as a ground for refusal to con-
firm. The parties had dealt fairly with each other upon execution of the
mortgage, and the realities of the situation force the recognition that refusal
of such confirmation was actually due solely to what the court considered
inadequacy of price resulting from a cause entirely extraneous to the spe-
cific transaction.
24
What is the meaning of inadequacy of price in such a situation? Obvi-
ously, price can be inadequate only in relation to something else. As to what
this other factor is, three answers have been given by various courts: (i)
market value, (2) fair market value, (3) true, intrinsic, fair or reasonable
value.
Despite statements to the contrary, there would seem to be no satisfac-
tory distinction between price and market value. They are apparently one
and the same thing, the amount the property will bring at public sale. Fair
market value is purely a fiction and like all fictions should be a solution of
last resort. In Market Street National Bank v. Huff,25 the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court declared "When the Act speaks of 'fair value at the time of
sale' it means what it says, namely, fair market value at the time of the sale,
as fixed by men competent and qualified to express an opinion, not a surmise
based on a future which no man can possibly forecast, and upon factors
imagined and not now existing. There can be no other fair value except fair
market value. Any other would not be fair, but speculative." 21 In view of
the fact that the price brought at public sale was approximately two-thirds of
what the court declared to be the "fair market value", it is difficult to con-
ceive of a more speculative test than that here adopted. Perhaps the court
feels that the sale is a forced one and that the inability of the vendor to
negotiate at length with prospective purchasers has prevented his obtaining
a maximum return. On the other hand, possible vendees at judicial sale are
aware that the property is definitely going to be sold to the highest bidder,
and they must make the most of their opportunity. Furthermore, in the
theory of the law, the market value of property should be determined by the
demand on the part of buyers and not the desires of the seller. At least this
is so where there is no real market for the property. Though this alleged
test of "fair market value" is perhaps a consciously loose definition in order
to permit proper results, one cannot be blind to the fact that it is value in
quacy of price is not a presumption of fact but a rule of law to the effect that "gross" in-
adequacy of price will justify refusal to confirm.
24. An analogy exists between this situation and that where the vendee of a contract for
the sale of land seeks specific performance in equity on the ground of insolvency of the
vendor. There, courts frequently treat insolvency only as a makeweight and give specific per-
formance because of a purported combination of insolvency with other grounds for equitable
relief, when in fact such other grounds do not exist. Livesley v. Johnston, 45 Ore. 30, 52,
76 Pac. 946, 951 (1904). See Note (1934) 82 U. OF PA. L. REv. 515.
25. 319 Pa. 286, I79 Atl. 582 (1935). This case is interesting because the Pennsylvania
Deficiency Judgment Act of January 17, 1934, P. L. 243 [PA. STAT. ANx. (Purdon Supp.
1934) tit. 21, § 8o6], which expired without a direct test of its constitutionality in the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court, spoke of "fair value at the time of sale!'. The Act of 1935 re-
states this. Whether the interpretation adopted by the court in the instant case will be im-
portant in determining the constitutionality of the act remains to be seen. A lower court has
already held the 1935 act to be constitutional on the ground that were it not for the act there
would be an "unjust enrichment of mortgagees at the expense of helpless mortgagors".
Phila. Leg. Intelligencer, Oct. 31, 1935, at I.
26. Italics added.
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vacuo. The court is talking of market value when there is no market and
adding an adjective to nullify the noun. Particularly does this seem to be
true where the judge, unwilling to trust his own judgment or that of ap-
praisers, leaves determination of the amount to a jury.
2 7
The third test, favored by the majority of courts which have broken
with the past, has been variously termed "fair", "real", "true" or "reasonable"
value. The difference is one of nomenclature and not of substance. There has
been as yet no conscious formulation of standards by which to measure this
value, which would seem to rest upon the concept of an intrinsic worth, or
use-value. To the objection that this is somewhat indefinite, at least one
reply may be made. Perhaps in time such standards will evolve as they have
done over a period of years in connection with the determination of the rates
to be charged by carriers, such rates being based upon a "fair evaluation"
of the carrier's property. 28 The problem is not a simple one, and no graver
error could be made than to attempt to achieve a mathematical formula to
meet the creditor's cry for certainty. The important fact to remember is
that fair value, however it may be measured, is not a fiction. It is indis-
putable that properties are worth more than the price they bring today, and a
reasonable approximation of this difference is the most that should be
expected.
The objection to inadequacy of price, in its true meaning, as a ground
sufficent in itself to justify refusal to confirm rests fundamentally upon (i)
unwillingness to determine minor inadequacies through detailed investigation
by already overcrowded tribunals, and (2) the feeling that the parties have
made their bargain and must abide by it. Whatever the basis, the fact that
this rule of words and not of application has crystallized into law cannot be
ignored. Courts that have refused to follow logic or to recognize the rule
for what it is have nevertheless found at least one way of reaching what seems
a desirable result. Thus, some courts have devised an artificial distinction
which may point the way out while preserving intact the integrity of the
classic formula-gross inadequacy of price will justify refusal to confirm
whereas mere inadequacy of price will not.?9  The vituperative epithet may
27. § 4 of the Pennsylvania Act of 1935 provides, "Any party in interest may, prior
to the time of the hearing, demand in writing a jury trial on any material issue or issues of
fact raised by the pleadings, whereupon the said issue or issues shall be determined by a
jury trial as in other cases."
28. In Farmer's and Mechanic's Savings Bank of City of Lockport v. Eagle Building
Co., 153 Misc. 554, 276 N. Y. Supp. 246 (Sup. Ct. 1934), the court sustains the contention
that in arriving at market value there should be taken into consideration replacement costs,
usable floor area, condition of the building, location of the site, adaptability for various uses,
fairness of assessed value, and the trend of the renting market.
It is significant that New York courts define "fair market value!' as the price a willing
purchaser would pay and for which a willing owner would sell. Under this definition,
there is no escape from the conclusion that in the overwhelming majority of recent fore-
closure sales there could be no such standard as "fair market value" simply because there
were no willing buyers.
29. That such a distinction is not meaningful is well illustrated by the language of
many cases. See supra note 8. A clear holding that gross inadequacy of price is in itself
sufficient is to be found in Lamb v. Kelley, 97 W. Va. 409, 125 S. E. 1o2 (1924). "In the
earlier cases it was held that mere inadequacy of price was not a sufficient ground, but that
such price coupled with an irregularity in the conduct of the sale would be sufficient. In
later cases it was held that gross inadequacy of price is a sufficient reason to justify the set-
ting aside of a sheriff's sale." In re Downham Co., 165 Atl. 152 (Del. Super. 1932) (sale
for $85o of canning factory costing $25,ooo and worth between $200o and $5ooo set aside
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explain away considerable case law of the past, and courts following the
classic method have frequently found this a convenient aid to solution of
their difficulties.
Refusal of confirmation, once determined upon, has been accomplished
by a variety of procedures. Most direct has been outright refusal to con-
firm coupled with an absolute order of resale. Such a policy disregards the
possibility that the mortgagee will consent to the imposition of equitable
conditions, in which event there would be no need of holding another futile
sale.
Another practice is the fixing of an upset or minimum price below which
there will not be confirmation. It has met with a host of objections as applied
to this situation in the law. 30 It has been asserted that this contravenes
statutes permitting deficiency judgments and amounts to the infliction of a
penalty upon the mortgagee. 31 The practice has, however, one great advan-
tage in the situation where the plaintiff-mortgagee allows the property to pass
into the hands of a third person at judicial sale in reliance upon obtaining a
deficiency judgment for the balance of the debt. If he should not be able
because of local law to obtain the arithmetical balance due according to the
classic method of deficiency determination, the question of deprivation of
property without due process of law might conceivably be raised. Such a
contention could not be maintained successfully if the mortgagee were to be
advised in advance of the sale as to the minimum price necessary to insure
confirmation. He would then be able to protect himself up to the fair value
of the premises as determined by the court, by bidding that amount and re-
covering a deficiency judgment for the remainder. Though the argument
has been made that the theoretical reasons behind adoption of the upset price
in corporate foreclosures and reorganizations are not present in the situation
under discussion, 32 it seems difficult to justify the casting aside of a prac-
tically-advantageous legal device simply because its application has hitherto
been confined to a totally different legal problem.
The most common practice by far has been to allow the mortgagee the
option of crediting the debtor with the reasonable value of the property
rather than the price actually brought, resale being ordered on his refusal to
do so. Where the price brought exceeds the value, as occasionally happens,
the mortgagor is, of course, in no need of relief.
It should be observed that the adoption of any one of these procedures
creates no conclusive certainty that the deficiency will be determined equitably.
If the upset price is not bid, or the mortgagee rejects the option, the only
alternative is to order the premises sold again. 33 An endless succession of
since price brought was about half its value. On resale there was no bid. Finally the factory
was sold to satisfy the claim of another creditor for $8oo) ;, West Ridgelawn Cemetery v.
Jacobs, io8 N. J. Eq. 513, I55 At. 673 (1931).
30. Michigan Trust Co. v. Cody, 264 Mich. 258, 265, 249 N. W. 844, 846 (1933) ; cf.
United B. & L. v. Newman, 113 N. J. Eq. 244, 166 Atl. 537 (1933).
31. Michigan Trust Co. v. Cody, 264 Mich. 258, 249 N. W. 844 (1933).
32. The upset price device is employed in corporate foreclosures to protect the mnort-
gagees where the value of the property involved greatly restricts the number of possible pur-
chasers. See Weiner, Conflicting Funwtions of the Upset Price in Corporate Reorganization
(1927) 27 CoL. L. REv. 132, 136. For a criticism of the device as applied to ordinary mort-
gage foreclosures, see Note (1933) 42 YALE L. J. 960, 962.
33. See (0933) 27 ILL. L. REV. 95o, and cases therein cited.
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resales is by no means an appealing prospect. But as a practical matter, fore-
closing creditors in such situations do accept the alternative. Rejection would
carry in its wake delay and expense, two considerations anxious creditors
cannot ignore.
The question has been raised as to whether what has been said applies
to setting aside of sales after confirmation and injunctive relief against the
holding of a foreclosure sale. It would seem that confirmation places on
the one seeking to have the decree set aside a burden heavier than would
have been his in opposing confirmation beforehand. That denial of a de-
ficiency judgment after confirmation is not within the rule of Suring State
Bank v. Giese has been determined by the Wisconsin court in Kremer v.
Rule.34  There it was held that upon confirmation the legal consequences
prescribed by statute follow-among them rendering of judgment for the
deficiency. Other courts, however, have extended the equitable principles
above set forth to situations involving modification or setting aside of
decrees already confirmed. 35  Examination of the cases where injunctive
relief against sale is sought discloses a noticeable hesitancy to declare what
would, in effect, be a judicial moratorium. While such relief involves prob-
lems other than those of redefinition of deficiency, the attitude of the indi-
vidual court toward refusal of confirmation undoubtedly has a very im-
portant effect on that court's views concerning restraint of sale or modifica-
tion of a decree already confirmed. Thus, a jurisdiction which conditions
confirmation on the mortgagee's doing equity might well consider prayers
for restraint of sale as premature and petitions for setting aside completed
sales as belated.
It should be emphasized that the imposition of equitable conditions on
the mortgagee's right to foreclose has by no means as yet become a general
practice. The significance of what has been done lies in the strong probability
that jurisdictions that have changed their position will adhere to the newer
view permanently, and not merely for the duration of the emergency which
has provided the opportunity to prove its merits. It reflects the dual bases
of equity-a higher morality and a recognition that circumstances alter
cases. From a realistic standpoint more than procedural initiative is in-
volved. Whereas moratory relief merely suspends the right to foreclose,
judicial redefinition of deficiency directly affects the right itself. Those
courts and writers declaring that the modus operandi of determining de-
ficiency has merely been modified, ignore the actual fact of substantive
redefinition of deficiency, without benefit of statute, accomplished through
the application of principles inherent in the origin and being of equity.
Legislative Redefinition of Deficiency
Many legislatures have attempted to redefine deficiency. Frequently,
it was impossible to give the proposed bills careful consideration because
of other business or the necessity of immediate passage. In certain jurisdic-
34. 216 Wis. 331, 257 N. W. 166 (I934), cited supra note 21.
35. Washington v. Young, 224 Ala. 232, 139 So. 92 (i93i) ; Barnes v. Freed, 342 Ill. 73,
x73 N. E. 795 (1930). One allowing a report of sale to be confirmed, where objections later
raised were then known, without exception or complaint, is not entitled to have the exceptions
to sale sustained, and an order sustaining them should be reversed. Fidelity & Columbia
Trust Co. v. White Construction Co., go S. W. (2d) 55o, 551 (Ky. 1935).
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tions the statutes have been merely declaratory of the judicial redefinition,
already an accomplished fact therein. 36  In others, the courts of which had
continued to adhere to the classic means of measurement, the expressed will
of the legislature came as a fundamental change. All these statutes contain
at least some elements of indirect compulsory imposition of equitable con-
ditions on the foreclosing mortgagee. This is equally true whether the
statutes are intended to be effective for the duration of the emergency only
or embody a permanent policy. Regardless of the type of legislation in-
volved, the problem of constitutionality is certain to be eventually brought
forward by the contention that the obligation of contracts is impaired. This
is a difficulty not faced in judicial redefinition since the decisions of a court,
though they may be erroneous and subject to reversal on appeal, are certainly
not unconstitutional.3 7
It has been held repeatedly that the "obligation of contracts" clause of
the Federal Constitution is not violated where a statute affects only legally
binding agreements to be entered into after its enactment. 38  While such
a result emphasizes the desirability of passage of laws with an eye to the
future, it is unfortunately true that the great majority of legislators think
only in terms of the present and of relieving distress the roots of which lie
in the past. Consequently legislation of the types outlined above has been
almost wholly intended to affect pre-existing obligations and has thus been
directed toward achieving a result the prevention of which was the basic
reason for the insertion of the "impairment of obligations" clause in our
Constitution.39 So marked has been this tendency that occasionally severa-
bility of construction clauses have been omitted, and the court has felt itself
obliged to declare the entire act unconstitutional, both as to future and pre-
existing obligations. °
Where statutes have recited an emergency as their basis, courts have
been willing in some instances to stretch precedent and uphold the acts.
Blaisdell v. Home Building and Loan Association 41 has been frequently
cited as supporting this position. The problem therein presented, however,
was quite different from that here under discussion. The statute in that case
provided for temporary suspension of the obligation while enactments rede-
fining deficiency involve destruction of all or a portion of the right itself.
Justification of these statutes has been found in power created by the
emergency, or in a reasonable exercise of the police power. Fundamentally,
however, analysis of the decisions discloses that such courts regard economic
36. Kan. Laws 1933, C. 218. But Spec. Sess. Laws 1934, c. 3, § 2, provides that "prior
to March I, 1935, no deficiency judgment shall be enforced until the period of redemption as
allowed by existing law . . . has expired." By the Act of 1935, C. 226, § 2, this provision
is extended to January 15, 1937, in exactly the same language.
37. Central Land Co. v. Laidley, 159 U. S. 1O3 (1895).
38. Lehigh Water Co. v. Easton, 121 U. S. 388 (1887). See Von Hoffman v. City of
Quincy, 4 Wall. 535 (1866).
39. THE FEDERALIST No. 44; 3 FARRAND, RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION (IgII)
214; 2 FARRAND, id. 439. See also the opinion of Chief Justice Marshall, dissenting, in Og-
den v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 213, 355 (1827).
40. See in this connection the majority and dissenting opinions in Adams v. Spillyards,
187 Ark. 641, 6I S. W. (2d) 686 (1933).
41. 290 U. S. 398 (1934). The problem of whether deficiency judgment statutes are an
exercise of the police power would seem to rest upon the individual court's determination as
to whether they are intended to directly affect a particular group only (mortgagors) or the
general public.
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conditions rather than precedent as controlling. Their emphasis is on "the
times" rather than on "the law".
A typical statutory requirement is that the deficiency should be deter-
mined by subtracting the fair value of the land, rather than the price
actually obtained, from the obligation. Varying with the jurisdiction, this
"fair value" is to be determined by appraisers, by the court, or by a jury.
Regardless of the procedure in ascertaining the amount of the deficiency
every judge, when the issue of constitutionality is raised, faces this problem:
property mortgaged for $iooo brings $5o at foreclosure sale. If a modem
statute were in force, the mortgagor would owe nothing if the fair value
of the premises was $iooo. Before passage of the statute, in the absence of
judicial redefinition, the deficiency judgment would have been for $950.
Can a court which feels, as does the Maryland Court of Appeals,
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that judicial redefinition is an unwarranted departure from law, justifiably
conclude that such a statute is constitutional?
Where a mortgage is executed in a jurisdiction adhering to the classic
view, subsequent enactment of a modern statute deprives the mortgagee of
the deficiency judgment which would have been his under the law existing at
the time of the mortgage execution. And under the legal rule that parties are
presumed to contract with reference to the existing law,43 the mortgagee
may successfully assert this right to a deficiency as a term of the mortgage,
implied-in-law. In jurisdictions that had adopted judicial redefinition before
the effective date of the statute, a different problem arises. In the event
that the mortgagee is himself the purchaser he has nothing of which to com-
plain since in the hypothetical situation put there would have been no de-
ficiency even before enactment. However, where the purchaser is a stranger,
courts in these jurisdictions would before passage of the statute have given
the mortgagee a deficiency judgment. This distinction is justifiable since
the mortgagee, no longer having the land, is denied the benefit of the excess
of its intrinsic worth over the price obtained. The acts generally make no
distinction as regards the identity of the purchaser, and where this is so the
mortgagee sustains a definite loss. The argument might be made that he
has nothing of which to complain, not having chosen to protect himself by
buying in the property. This concept of a legal "duty" owed only to himself
is highly unsatisfactory, embodying an almost penal element. It does not
conceal the lessening in fact of the value of the creditor's right. This result
is avoided by legislative enactments, such as the North Carolina statute,4 .
providing that the fair value of the property rather than the price brought
should be deducted from the obligation only in the event that the mortgagee
was himself, or through another, the purchaser at the foreclosure sale.
Despite frequent statements that the identity of the purchaser should involve
no difference in legal consequences, such a distinction seems eminently just.
45
42. Kenly v. Huntington B. & L. Ass'n, 166 Md. 182, 17o AtI. 526 (1934). The force of
the court's holding is somewhat weakened by the admission that there was probably no gross
inadequacy involved here since almost $4000 was due in ground rents.
43. Adams v. Spillyards, 187 Ark. 641, 61 S. W. (2d) 686; McCracken v. Hayward, 2
How. 6o8 (U. S. 1844).
44. N. C. CODE ANx. (I935) § 2593 (b).
45. For this reason among others, the original New Jersey statute [N. J. LAWS 1933, c.
82, N. J. STAT. ANN. §§ 134-48, 134-491 was held unconstitutional in Vanderbilt v. Brunton
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In the unusual situation where the mortgagor buys in the premises at a
nominal figure, application of modem statutes making no distinction as to
the identity of the purchaser results in a reduction of the debt manifestly
contrary to constitutional provision. It is extremely unfortunate that the
failure to make such a distinction obliges courts to declare such enactments
unconstitutional in their entirety.
Attempted legal justification of these enactments has been based in large
part upon the contention that they merely provide a modus operandi of
measuring deficiency, affecting only the remedy afforded and not the sub-
stantive rights of the parties. 46  The validity of this distinction has been
generally recognized in constitutional law; however, it should be borne in
mind that frequently modification of the remedy may amount to virtual
deprivation of the right. In some jurisdictions the mortgagor may still
maintain an action at law on the bond although equity will grant no deficiency
judgment. Where this is the local law, deprivation of the remedy in equity
would not seem to violate constitutional provisions, the right being accom-
panied by a remedy to enforce it which is equally as adequate as that taken
away.
A practical test for determining whether there has been an "impairment
of obligation" is the ease of assignability of the mortgage. Before passage
of the modern statutes, transfer of the right would have netted the mortgagee
a fair percentage of the face value. After enactment, the right is dissoci-
ated from all the benefits which had given it worth.
Where the legislation embodies a permanent policy its unconstitution-
ality seems even more clear. The doubtful doctrine that an emergency creates
additional constitutional power cannot be enlisted to support a statute not
purporting to be an emergency measure. Occasionally a statute will set out
that it is merely declaratory of the already existing law, and that the courts
accordingly had always enjoyed the jurisdiction to effect redefinition. 4' This
legislative opinion of the prior state of the law, while interesting, is of course
not binding on the courts in the event that the statute is declared unconsti-
tutional. The majority of courts wherein the constitutionality of statutes
redefining deficiency has been tested have felt themselves obliged to declare
them violative of the "obligation of contract" clause.48  A few have managed
to salvage a provision that the act should apply to legally binding agreements
executed after its enactment because of the presence of the ordinary sever-
Piano Co., iii N. J. L. 596, 169 Atl. 177 (933). For the same reason the new Act [N. J.
LAws 1935, c. 88, N. J. STAT. Ax. 1935, §§ 134-49 (I) to 134-49 (3)] was held unconstitu-
tional in Sayre v. Duffy, 179 Atl. 459 (N. J. Sup. 1935).
46. It seems clear that the principal purpose of such statutes has been to affect the obliga-
tion of the mortgage debtor, perhaps directly by attempting to deprive the courts of juris-
diction to grant deficiency judgments or only a trifle less directly by adopting the "fair
value" rule. See Adams v. Spillyards, 187 Ark. 641, 61 S. W. (2d) 686 (1933) ; Langever
v. Miller, 76 S. W. (2d) O25 (Tex. Sup. Ct. 1934).
47. Kan. Laws 1933, C. 218. See szt-pfr note 36.
48. In New Jersey see Vanderbilt v. Brunton Piano Co., iii N. J. L. 596, i69 Atl. 177
(933), and Sayre v. Duffy, 179 AtI. 459 (N. J. Sup. I935). In Arkansas see Adams v.
Spillyards, 187 Ark. 641, 6i S. W. (2d) 686 (1933). In Texas see Langever v. Miller, 76
S. W. (2d) 1025 (Tex. Sup. Ct. 1934). The New York courts have tried to avoid the ques-
tion of constitutionality of the New York Act [CIV. PRACT. Acr IO83-a, as amended by
Laws 1933 Ex. Sess. c. 794, § 2, as amended by Laws 1934, C. 562], providing for full satis-
faction if no motion for entry of a deficiency judgment is made within ninety days. See New
York Life Ins. Co. v. H. & J. Guttag Corp., 265 N. Y. 292, 295, 192 N. E. 481, 482 (1934).
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ability of construction clause.4 9 As to pre-existing obligations, the fact
that the mortgagee is forced to forego a portion of the debt of which the
contract, valid when made, gave him ownership, has generally been sufficient
basis for holding such statutes unconstitutional.
In some jurisdictions there has been no direct pronouncement by the
highest local tribunal as to the validity of this type of legislation because of
the relatively limited period for which it was declared to be effective. So, in
Pennsylvania, the Act of 1933, a hasty and ill-drawn measure, was replaced
by a more carefully-considered statute in 1935, before the Supreme Court
had passed on the earlier act.50
By what might seem to the layman to be a curious quirk of the law,
jurisdictions such as New Jersey, which have been extremely liberal in allow-
ing judicial redefinition, have declared specific legislative attempts directed
toward securing the same result, by substantially similar procedures, to be
unconstitutional. Anomalous as this may appear at first glance, thoughtful.
consideration of the problems faced in each instance compels the recognition
that such a difference in conclusion is legally almost inevitable. The consti-
tutional restriction that "no state shall pass any law impairing the obligation
of contracts" is a rein upon legislative and not court action. It is, to be true,
the modern fashion to consider constitutional law as extremely flexible, with
its roots deeply imbedded in public policy, and it might be thought that the
acts could easily be upheld. Such a view is justified when a novel situation
arises, but in this problem a considerable body of case law is directly in point.
The typical factual situation presented in a deficiency judgment question is
as old as the Constitution. Precedent has clustered quickly about the bare
words of the constitutional section giving it in this connection, for better or
worse, a rigidity not easily overcome.
Concilsion
The aim of the law should be the establishment of a policy sufficiently
elastic to be relatively permanent, which penalizes neither mortgagor nor
mortgagee, but gives to each what is his due. The classic method of defi-
ciency determination is fundamentally unsound, failing to distinguish between
price and worth. Whatever justice it may achieve in a given case is not due
to its intrinsic merits, but rather to the accidental correspondence of price
with worth, because of the state of the times. Redefinition of deficiency as
the amount remaining payable by the mortgagor after deduction of the fair
value of the premises, rather than the price actually obtained at foreclosure
sale, from the face of the obligation, accomplishes a nicer balance of the
equities between the parties which is not disturbed by changing economic
conditions. It should be recognized more clearly than it has been in the
past that this is a substantive redefinition of a right, and not merely a
procedural change. Legislative redefinition cannot legally surmount the con-
stitutional obstacle against impairment of pre-existing obligations. The
attention of the legislatures should be focused, then, on the application of
redefinition to legally binding agreements to be entered into in the future.
Judicial redefinition of deficiency, by way of refusal of confirmation unless
49. N. C. CODE AxN. (1935) § 2593 (C) ; S. D. LAws 1933, c. 138. These applied spe-
cifically to mortgages to be given in the future.
56. See sipra note 25.
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the mortgagee consents to the imposition of equitable conditions, is not sub-
ject to these objections. The flexibility, feasibility, and fairness of this
method make its permanent adoption advisable. The machinery of equity
has been built to meet just such situations. There is no good reason why it
should not be used.
J. M. S., Jr.
Creditors' Rights in Insurance Policies during Life of the Insured
The rise of modem commercialism has been attended with many inter-
esting mutations in the relations between business men. The key relation of
debtor and creditor, in particular, has undergone drastic modifications. No
averagely alert person today will deny that the trend of modern commercial
legislation and practice is toward the relief of the debtor from some of the
more or less onerous obligations imposed in favor of the creditor by the older
legal rules. Only a century or so ago men languished in debtors' prisons,
committed at the suit of their creditors, surrounded by conditions to which
the most reviled of criminals was hardly subjected, and heartened with no
opportunity to do so much as work off their obligations.1 Today, legislatures
attempt to raise the standard of humanitarianism by enacting liberal laws for
exemptions, extensions and reorganizations.
Along with other kinds of commercial endeavor the device of insurance
has also progressed; even the ordinary life insurance policy of the present
day, glittering with all modern conveniences in the way of "special features",
is a far cry from the original mutual agreement known to the common law.
Inevitable, in connection with such a development in the merchandise, was a
corresponding advancement in the rules which govern its existence. Here
too, it will be seen, the tendency-in many instances the primary considera-
tion-is to build a protective bulwark which will shield the insured and his
assets from the onset of his obligees.
This note will not concern itself, except incidentally, with the status of
a debtor's entire contract (policy). Its scope includes only the creditor's rights
in one aspect of that contract, namely the so-called "cash surrender value". A
working definition, admittedly rough but sufficient for present purposes, is
as follows: The cash surrender value of an insurance policy is that portion
of the money paid to the insurer by the insured which exceeds the amount
necessarily expended by the insurer in financing the policy.
2 Under the terms
of most modern insurance policies (including the soi-disant endowment and
annuity contracts-of which more later) this cash surrender value is payable
to the insured on demand by him, after the policy has been in force for a
stipulated period but before the maturity thereof.3 Such a potential fund of
I. Still annoying, it should be noted, is the question of whether imprisonment of a re-
spondent for contempt of court in failing to obey an equity decree for the payment of money
is in fact imprisonment for debt. For the most recent focus upon this see TIME, Nov. II,
1935, at 12.
2. Cf. 3 Couch, CYCLOPEDTA o1V INSURANCE LAw (1929) § 647a; VANCE, INSURANCE
(2d ed. 193o) at pp. 54-56.
3. Cf. provision in standard ordinary life policy of the Equitable Life Assurance So-
ciety: "Within three months after default in the payment of any premium after two full
years' premiums have been paid, the Insured may elect . . . (a) To surrender this policy
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cash, usually due absolutely and from an eminently solvent source, is too
luscious a sweetmeat long to be ignored by a creditor starved by nonpayment
and oftentimes temporarily frustrated by his debtor's insolvency. Conse-
quently it is hardly surprising that its reachability by creditors of a bankrupt
insured is a question frequently submitted for adjudication.
LIFE POLICIES
(a) Bankruptcy
Since all problems under this head must first be considered in the light
of the Federal Bankruptcy Act, 4 it may not be amiss to inquire briefly into
the applicable provisions of that statute. Section 7oa enacts:
"That when any bankrupt shall have any insurance policy which has a
cash surrender value payable to himself, his estate, or personal repre-
sentatives, he may, within thirty days after the cash surrender value has
been ascertained and stated to the trustee by the company issuing the
same, pay or secure to the trustee the sum so ascertained and stated, and
continue to hold, own, and carry such policy free from the claims of the
creditors participating in the distribution of his estate under the bank-
ruptcy proceedings, otherwise the policy shall pass to the trustee as
assets." 5
This would seem to be fairly clear; but another relevant part of the Act,
Section 6,6 beclouds the point by providing that
"This act shall not affect the allowance to bankrupts of the exemp-
tions which are prescribed by the State laws in force at the time of the
filing of the petition. .
Taken concomitantly, these provisions were originally held to compel
the result that the policies passed to the trustee in bankruptcy as assets of
the debtor. 7 Of course it follows that if the policies are not secured to the
insured, neither is the cash surrender value of those policies. The circuit
court of appeals, however, reversed the district court on this score and held
that Section 6 was not limited by Section 7oa, but required federal bank-
ruptcy courts to declare exempt any policies which were so under state
statutes." Final sanction was given this opinion when the Supreme Court
ruled, in the renowned case of Holden v. Stratton,9 to the same effect. Sub-
sequent cases 10 in the Supreme Court seem to limit the application of this
and receive its net cash value, which shall be the cash value as determined in accordance with
[an attached] table increased by the cash value of any Dividend Additions and reduced by
the amount of any indebtedness (including interest) to the Society against this policy. . ..
4. 30 STAT. 544 (I898), II U. S. C. A. (1927).
5. Id. at 566, i U. S. C. A. § io (1927).
6. Id. at 548, i U. S. C. A. §24 (1927).
7. In re Lange, 91 Fed. 361 (N. D. Iowa 1899) ; it re Steele, 98 Fed. 78 (S. D. Iowa
1899).
8. Steele v. Buel, io4 Fed. 968 (C. C. A. 8th, 19oo).
9. I98 U. S. 202 (io5).
io. Burlingham v. Crouse, 228 U. S. 459 (1913); Cohen v. Samuels, 245 U. S. 5o
(1917) ; Cohn v. Malone, 248 U. S. 450 (9ig).
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rule, but, it is submitted, leave it substantially in full force for purposes of the
present discussion."
In view of the above rule, one is brought perforce to a contemplation of
the germane legislative declarations of the various states. At last computa-
tion forty-seven states and the District of Columbia were found to have some
kind of statute exempting, to a greater or less extent, the proceeds of life
insurance policies from the claims of creditors. 1 2  Hence the controverted
question, What are the rights of creditors, in the absence of a statute? be-
comes, for the nonce at least, unimportant. 1 3  On the other hand, an exami-
nation of the theory, phraseology and construction of the state exemption
laws seems definitely in order.
As to the first point just enumerated, Judge Cooley summarizes thus:
"All the statutes bearing on the exemption of life policies or their proceeds
seem based on the theory that, in the absence of an expressed contrary intent,
the object of an ordinary life insurance policy should be considered as the
protection of the insured's family after his death, and that this object and
desire is laudable and in accordance with public policy." 14 Such a statement,
on its face, appears almost to approach truism; but some reflection, together
ii. The Burlingham case held that bankrupt could keep the policies if he paid the
amount of the cash surrender value to the trustee, but that if the policy had no cash surren-
der value, bankrupt would have the policy outright; the Cohen and Cohn cases did not con-
sider section 6 of the Bankruptcy Act.
12. Ala. Gen. Acts Extra Sess. 1932, no. 16o, p. i9o; ARIz. REv. CODE (Struckmeyer,
1928) § 1738 (3) ; ARx. DIG. STAT. (Castle, Supp. 1931) § 5989a; Ark. Laws 1933, no. l02,
p. 321; CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. (Deering, 1931) § 69o (18); 2 COLO. ANN. STAT. (Court-
right's Mills, 1930) § 3592a; CONN. GEN. STAT. (Supp. 1935) c. 220, § I56 8c; 37 Del. Laws
1931, c. 52, § 43; 48 STAT. 1125, 1175 (Dist. Col. 1934) ; 3 FiA. CoMp. Lxws ANN. (Skill-
man, 1928) §§ 7065, 7066; Ga. Laws 1933, no. 336, p. 181; IDAHO CODE ANN. (1932) tit. 8,
§ 204 (9) ; ILL. REv. STAT. (Cahill & Moore, 1935) c. 73, 11342; IND. STAT. ANN. (Baldwin,
1934) § 9957; IoWA CODE (1931) § 8776, amended 45 Iowa Laws 1933, c. 150; KAN. REV.
STAT. (Supp. 1931) c. 40, § 414; Ky. STAT. (Carroll, 193o) § 655; 2 LA. GEN. STAT. ANN.
(Dart, 1932) § 41o5, amended La. Laws 1934, no. 155, P. 520; M& REv. STAT. (i930) c. 6o,
§ 144; I MD. ANN. CODE (Bagby, 1924) art. 45, §§ 8, 9, art. 48A, § 86; 2 MAss. GEN. LAws
(1932) c. 175, §§ 125, 126, amended Mass. Acts 1933, c. 42; 3 MIcH. CoMP. LAWS (1929)
§§ 12451, 12452, amended Mich. Laws 1931, no. 170, p. 262; I MINN. STAT. (Mason, 1927)
§ 3387; I MIss. CODE (1930) §§ 1755, 1756, 1757; Miss. Laws 1932, c. 138 § IO (c) ; I Mo.
REv. STAT. (1929) §§ 5736-5739; 3 MONT. REV. CODE (1921) § 9428 (7); Neb. Laws 1933,
c. 73; 4 NEv. COMp. LAws (Hillyer, 1929) § 8844 (14); N. H. Laws 1931, c. 175; 2 N. J.
CoMP. STAT. (Insurance igio) p. 2850, §§ 35, 38, 39; N. M. STAT. ANN. (Courtright, 1929)
c. 48, § io6; N. M. Laws 1933, c. 67; N. Y. CONS. LAWS (Cahill, 1930) c. 30, § 55a; N. Y.
CONS. LAWS (Cahill, Cum. Supp. 1931-1935) c. 30, §§ 55b, 55c; N. C. CODE (Michie, 1935)
§§ 6464, 6464 (a); N. C. CONST. art. 10, § 7, app. I, p. 2632; N. D. CoMp. LAWS (Supp.
1925) § 8718a; N. D. Laws 1927, C. 225; amended N. D. Laws 1929, c. 149; OHIO CODE ANN.
(Throckmorton's Baldwin, 1934) § 9394, 9397, 9398; 2 OKIA. STAT. (1931) §§ 10517, 10518;
3 ORE. CODE ANN. (1930) tit. 46, § 514; PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 193o) tit. 50, §§ 514, 515,
517; PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, Supp. 1934) tit. 40, § 766; R. I. Acts and Resolves 1931, c.
1757, §§ 13, I4; 3 S. C. CiV. CODE (1932) § 7985 [violates S. C. CONST. art. III, § 28, and is
invalid. Itl re Cunningham, 15 F. (2d) 700 (E. D. S. C. 1926)]; I S. D. COMB. LAWS
(1929) § 2661; 2 S. D. CoMB. LAWS (1929) § 931o, amended S. D. Laws 1931, c. 170, §9310;
TENN. CODE (1932) §§ 8456, 8457, 8458; TEx. STAT. (1928) art. 5o68a; TEx. STAT. (Supp.
1931) art. 3832a; UTAH REv. STAT. ANN. (933) tit. 104, c. 37, § 13 (8) ; VT. GEN. LAWS
(1917) §§3531, 3534; 8 WASH. REv. STAT. (Remington, 1931) tit. 45, §7230-1; W. VA.
CODE (1931) c. 33, art. 3, §34; W. VA. CODE (1931) c. 48, art. 3, §23; WIs. STAT. (1931)
§§ 246.09, 272.18 (19), amended Wis. Laws 1933, c. 320, § I; WYo. REV. STAT. ANN. (I93I)
art. 57, § 236.
13. ". . . there is no doubt that unless restrained by statute this cash surrender value
is an asset available to the creditors." GLENN, CREDITORS' RIGHTS AND REMEDIES (1915)
§ 53, P. 41. Such a categorical statement may perhaps be questioned.
14. 7 CoOLEY, BRIEFS ON INSURANCE (2d ed. 1928) 65o8.
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with recent court decisions and legislative enactments, will show that it must
be strictly limited to its express words. Cash surrender value and also ulti-
mate tontine payments collectible under endowment policies cannot validly be
said to be embraced in these terms; disability benefits must not be included;
dividends on policies are not within its purview; annuity contracts, latest and
most elusive efflorescence of the insurance business, are outside of its ambit.
Furthermore, the very words must be rigidly construed: a provision for the
right to receive a given cash value is plainly not an indication of a desire
on the part of an insured to protect his family after his death; yet such
cash value is almost universally held to be "proceeds" within the verbiage of
a statute which provides in substance that the "proceeds" of life insurance
policies taken out for the benefit of certain classes of beneficiaries shall be
free from the claims of creditors. 15 It would perhaps be more accurate to
say that modern exemption statutes for the most part proceed on the even
broader theory that the object of a life insurance policy is, first, the protection
of insured's family after his death, and second, the security of both insured
and his family during his life. In any case, however, the statutes rest on the
proposition that neither a debtor nor his estate should be permitted to sustain
a complete plucking at the hands of his creditors. Indubitably, of course, the
plight of such a debtor's family is of ponderous import in any judicial or
legislative mind.
Concerning the phraseology of the exemption laws, it may be said
without exaggeration that there are practically as many variations therein as
there are jurisdictions in which they prevail. It has been remarked that
"There is such a lack of uniformity in the statutes relating to this subject
• that a movement to make uniform the law . . . might be wise in
the interest not only of the insurance companies, but of the business public
as well." "6 Yet while this is literally true, even a cursory survey serves to
demonstrate that the statutes readily divide into groups, according to their
language, their viewpoint, and the kinds of situations they are designed to
cover. Due to almost infinite differences in wording, the outlines of each
category are, it is true, anything but distinct; there is an inescapable over-
running and diffusing from one to another. Matters are further complicated
by the fact that a great majority of states has on the books several separate
acts, operating concurrently, each one of which may fall into a different
group from its fellows. 17  But some sort of classification, however crude, is
possible, and, it is believed, desirable.
The largest aggregation, represented by acts in over twenty states,
is best illustrated by the New York statute.'8 This type of act provides,
in substance, that if a policy of insurance is effected by one person for the
benefit of another, the "lawful beneficiary", other than the insured, shall be
entitled to the "proceeds and avails" of the policy as against creditors of the
15. Magnuson v. Wagner, I F. (2d) 99 (C. C. A. 8th, 1924); In re Lang, 20 F. (2d)
236 (E. D. Pa. 1927) aff'd sub nom. Dussoulas v. Lang, 24 F. (2d) 254 (C. C. A. 3d, 1928) ;
Dawson v. Nat. Life Ins. Co., 156 Tenn. 306, 30o S. W. 567 (1927). But cf. Morgan v.
McCaffrey, 286 Fed. 922 (C. C. A. 5th, 1923).
16. Young, Bankruptcy and Exemption Statutes as Affecting Disposition of Life Insur-
ance Proceeds (ig8) I PRocEaINGs OF THE AssociATIox OF LIFE INSURANcE CouNsHm, no.
XXIII, p. 7.
17. See, e. g., Maryland, New Jersey and Washington, cited supra. note 12.
I8. N. Y. CONS. LAws (Cahill, 193o) c. 30, § 55a.
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insured. Federal courts, administering such a statute in bankruptcy pro-
ceedings, have held that it exempts the cash surrender value of a life insur-
ance policy.19 It will be observed that this construction in point of fact
exempts to the bankrupt-only indirectly to the beneficiary; for the result
of such a holding is that when the insured obtains his discharge, he is enabled
to make his new start still numbering the policies among his assets.20 Subse-
quently he may at his pleasure maintain them as insurance on his life, pro-
ceeds to go to the named beneficiary, or surrender the policies to the insur-
ance company in return for their cash value, or exercise any of the "options"
which he may be allowed by the terms of the contracts. The rationale of
most of the decisions is that the beneficiary has acquired a "vested interest"
by being designated in the policy, which interest may not be interfered with
by creditors of the bankrupt or by the trustee in bankruptcy acting in their
behalf.21  Whatever one may think of the cogency of such reasoning, it
surely is not difficult to follow if the policy contains no clause reserving to
insured the right to change the beneficiary. Actually, however, practically
all modern insurance contracts do contain this kind of provision, thus cast-
ing doubt on the "vested" nature of the beneficiary's interest, and it is usually
necessary to resort to some other device in order to protect the wife or family
of the bankrupt.22  The obvious step has been taken: courts decide that in
such a case the beneficiary's interest is not contingent, but vested at the
issuance of the policy, subject to be divested by any change the insured may
make in accordance with its terms. 23  The general purpose, of course, is
the same in either instance, and is perhaps the controlling consideration in
the minds of the courts. If this is true, those tribunals which rule to the
contrary when insured has reserved the "right to change" will be seen to be
following the line of strict logic rather than that of social policy. Particu-
larly notable is the fact that many ,legislatures, probably with the likelihood
of such a decision in mind, have included in the type of statute under discus-
sion an additional provision to the effect that the act shall operate "regardless
of whether or not the insured has reserved to himself the right to change the
beneficiary". 24  At present the trend seems markedly in this direction.2 5
Meanwhile it seems safe to say that in the absence of any similar statutory
benediction, the beneficiary's rights, however tenuous, will continue to receive
the benison of judicial pronouncement.
26
ig. In re Pfaffinger, 164 Fed. 526 (W. D. Ky. 19o8) ; In re Messinger, 29 F. (2d) 158
(C. C. A. 2d, 1928) cert. denied sub non. Reilly v. Messinger, 279 U. S. 855 (1929) ; In re
Sturdevant, 29 F. (2d) 795 (W. D. N. Y. 1928).
2o. Cf. In re Messinger, 29 F. (2d) 158, 16o (C. C. A. 2d, 1928) cert. denied sub norn.
Reilly v. Messinger, 279 U. S. 855 (1929).
21. The authorities are collected in VANCE, INSURANCE (2d ed. 1930) pp. 541-543.
22. For arguments that "the reservation of the right to change the beneficiary does not
make the cash value payable to the insured bankrupt within the meaning of the proviso
clause" of the Bankruptcy Act (§ 7oa), see Howland, The National Bankruptcy Act as Re-
lating to Life Insurance (1914) 1 PROCEEDrNGS OF THE ASSocIATION OF LIFE INSURANCE
COUNSEL, no. II, pp. 8-io.
23. Cases are collected and classified in VANCE, INSURANcE (2d ed. 1930) pp. 559-569.
24. See, e. g., 48 STAT. 1125, 1175 (Dist. Col. 1934) ; 2 MASS. GEN. LAWS (1932) c. 175,
§ 125; N. Y. CONS. LAWS (Cahill, 1930) c. 30, § 55a.
25. See Patten, The Effect of Insured's Bankruptcy on Policies Payable to His Wife,
but Reserving the Right to Change (1929) 4 PROCEEDINGS OF THE ASSOcIATION OF LiFE IN-
SURANCE COuNSEL 259, 264.
26. See Patten, supra note 25, at 285.
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A second group of exemption statutes, not so widely distributed as
the first, but nevertheless existent in some form in about ten jurisdictions,
is one the constituents of which provide in effect that it shall be lawful for
any married woman to insure her husband for her benefit, and if she sur-
vives said husband she shall be entitled to the proceeds of the insurance thus
effected, free aird clear of the claims of creditors.27 That this kind of enact-
ment does not protect cash values would seem too clear to admit of any
controversy, since the wife's exemption is made expressly to depend on
survivorship. Complications, however, are injected when, as is so often
the case, a statute like the above is carried in connection with one of a third
type. Type three reads approximately thus: Any policy of life insurance,
or the proceeds thereof, effected for the benefit of a married woman, shall
inure to her separate use and benefit, free and clear of the claims of credi-
tors.28  The evident purpose of these statutes is the primal one of protecting
the helpless surviving spouse; but here as elsewhere the development has
been towards exempting the cash surrender value to the insured during his
life.29  Consequently the statute is made an instrument for the immediate
protection of the insured, the beneficiary (presumably insured's wife) profit-
ing only ultimately and by indirection. The wisdom of this construction has
been remarked; otherwise the statute's "failure to protect the cash surrender
value-the keystone upon which the policy rests-results in there being no
proceeds at death to be protected." 30 In accord is the highly important rule,
previously referred to, that "proceeds" is a word which comprises also the
cash surrender value.3 1
Sometimes the exemption of insurance, in whole or in part, is achieved
by merely appending a clause to the enumerations of the general exemption
law of the particular state. This is likely to assume a form somewhat like
the following: All moneys, benefits, privileges or immunities derived from
life insurance on the life of the debtor are exempt, etc.; 32 or perhaps, All
money received by or payable to a surviving wife or child on the life of a
deceased husband or father are exempt, etc.33 For the most part these
provisions are quite clear as far as they go; unfortunately many of them are
inadequate when applied to situations involving principles beyond the ele-
mentary.3 4
Of the other statutes on the subject, more or less superficially conform-
able to the categories above suggested, some are extremely loose, covering
only a limited field; others are sweepingly absolute. An example of the
former is the class which declares that the avails of life insurance policies
payable to the representative or estate of the insured are not subject to the
27. See, e. g., ILL. REv. STAT. (Cahill & Moore, 1935) c. 73, ff 342.
28. See, e. g., 3 MICM. Coml'. LA~ws (1929) §§ 12451, 12452; VT. GEN. LAWs (1917)
§§ 3531, 3534.
29. Ehrhart v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., 45 F. (2d) 8o4 (S. D. Ill. 1929) ; In re Reiter, 58 F.
(2d) 631 (C. C. A. 2d, 1932) ; In re Miller, 74 F. (2d) 86 (C. C. A. 8th, 1934).
3o. Patten, mspra note 25, at 266.
31. Magnuson v. Wagner, i F. (2d) 99 (C. C. A. 8th, 1924) ; In re Lang, 2o F. (2d)
236 (E. D. Pa. 1927) aff'd sub non. Dussoulas v. Lang, 24 F. (2d) 254 (C. C. A. 3d, 1928);
Dawson v. Nat. Life Ins. Co., 156 Tenn. 306, 300 S. W. 567 (1927), cited note 15, supra.
32. Cf. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. (Deering, 1931) § 690 (I8).
33. Cf. AmIz. REv. CODE (Struckineyer, 1928) § 1738 (13).
34. See the result in In re Hammells, 5 F. (2d) 879 (D. Ariz. 1925), decided under the
Arizona statute cited note 33, supra.
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debts of decedent except by special contract; 35 typical of the latter group
is that stipulating that all moneys, avails, cash surrender values and all and
every benefit accruing under any policy or certificate of life insurance payable
to a beneficiary other than the estate of the insured shall be exempt from
garnishment, attachment, or other process and from all claims of the credi-
tors of the insured. 3 6  Between these two outposts are individual variations
so manifold as to render their application a matter of personal interpretation.
But in all cases the liberalizing bias of the courts should be kept in mind.
Federal decisions under the state exemption statutes have been legion.
Where the statute has been previously construed by a. state court, the federal
court must naturally follow that construction; 3' but where no state court
has passed upon its statute, the federal court will reach an independent
conclusion A In such a situation it would be futile to speak of, or even to
attempt a formulation of a "federal rule" and a "state rule." While each
case does not require special examination, each statute probably does. One
can do no more than note a crude provisional principle, a proclivity rather
than a prescription. On this score it can be said that, due no doubt to forces
above intimated, a construction favorable to the debtor will be adopted
wherever the legislative language permits.39 A few courts adhere stead-
fastly to the rigid "vested-or-contingent" dogma, 40 but most, while perhaps
paying lip-service to time-honored concepts, manage to achieve within their
bounds a result consonant with more newly evolved relations between debtor
and creditor.4 1  Possibly the most striking characteristic of the decisions
is the recency, and withal the rapidity, of the liberalizing impulse. Partially
explainable by the fact that exemption statutes have become increasingly
broad and frequent 42 (and such fact in itself, it is submitted, cannot be
entirely due to agitation by the insurance companies), this disposition on the
part of the courts has been, of late years, remarkably accelerated. What
present conditions and opinions-in many instances lately revised-may
produce along this line can only be surmised.
Comparatively few cases in the state courts, it is obvious, involve adjudi-
cation of creditors' rights under the Bankruptcy Act, but there are several
circumstances where the question may arise. For instance, the trustee of a
deceased bankrupt may bring an equitable action against the administrator; 43
35. Cf. 2 N. D. Comp. LAws (1913) § 8719.
36. Cf. Neb. Laws 1933, C. 73.
37. Ralph v. Cox, i F. (2d) 435 (C. C. A. 8th, 1924).
38. In re Weick, 2 F. (2d) 647 (C. C. A. 6th, 1924); In re Lang, 20 F. (2d) 236 (E. D.
Pa. 1927) aff'd sub nor. Dussoulas v. Lang, 24 F. (2d) 254 (C. C. A. 3d, 1928) ; Schwartz
v. Holzman, 69 F. (2d) 814 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934).
39. See Young, loc. cit. supra note 16; Patten, loc. cit. supra note 26; cf. Jens v. Davis,
280 Fed. 706 (C. C. A. 8th, 1922) ; It re Cooper's Estate, 28 F. (2d) 438 (D. Md. 1928) ;
In re Reiter, 58 F. (2d) 631 (C. C. A. 2d, 1932) ; In re Phillips, 7 F. Supp. 807 (M. D. Pa.
1934).
40. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. Swett, 222 Fed. 200 (C. C. A. 6th, 1915) ; Whiting
v. Squires, 6 F. (2d) oo (C. C. A. 4th, 1925).
41. Brown v. Home Life Ins. Co., 3 F. (2d) 661 (E. D. Okla. 1925) ; see In re Ameri-
can Range & Foundry Co., 14 F. (2d) 308, 311 (D. Minn. 1926). For avowedly "liberal"
constructions, see Hickman v. Hanover, 33 F. (2d) 873 (C. C. A. 4th, 1929) ; In re Horwitz,
3 F. Supp. 16 (W. D. N. Y. 1933).
42. See Pierson, Recent Legislation Preserving Insurance Proceeds for Beneficiaries
(193o) 16 A. B. A. J. 23.
43. Dreyfus v. Barton, 98 Miss. 758, 54 So. 254 (i911).
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or the beneficiary may attempt to replevy the policy from the trustee. 4 It
is interesting to note that where the state courts have had an opportunity to
construe their own exemption laws, they have generally, if not always,
favored the insured or his beneficiary over the trustee.45 Possible signifi-
cance of this, however, is weakened by the paucity in the number of cases
actually decided on that point.
A companion problem, in the administration of the Bankruptcy Act, to
that of exemption statutes is one relating to the insured's right to exercise
his options under the policy. Modern policies frequently provide for the
election, at insured's will, of any one of numerous conveniences offered him
by the company. He may be given the right at any time to surrender the
policy in exchange for its then cash value; he may be allowed to cease paying
premiums, surrender the policy, and demand that the then surrender value
be applied by the company to paid-up insurance for a reduced amount; he
may, in the case of an endowment policy, be permitted to leave the matured
endowment deposited with the company and receive in return a policy paid
up to the amount of said endowment; or he may be suffered to take advantage
of any of the apparently innumerable devices springing from the ingenious
minds of those who write contracts of insurance.46  Should one of these
options lie within the power of insured, a trustee might well contend that
under Section 7oa of the Bankruptcy Act, above set out,47 he would be
entitled to exercise this option for the benefit of creditors. 48  State exemption
statutes condition the trustee's privilege in that regard, 49 as also do other
considerations of the forum, such as garnishment and attachment laws, and
the like. The cases turn predominantly about the first-mentioned privilege,
that of surrendering the policy for its cash value; and here at least formula-
tion of a general rule seems to be feasible. One textwriter has stated, "...
the policy is not to be regarded as liable to seizure under any form of judicial
44. Allen v. Central Wisconsin Trust Co., 143 Wis. 381, 127 N. W. lOO3 (iio).
45. Young v. Thomason, 179 Ala. 454, 6o So. 272 (1912) ; Murphy v. Casey, 15o Minn.
iO7, 184 N. W. 783 (1921) ; Dawsodi v. Nat. Life Ins. Co., 156 Tenn. 3o6, 300 S. W. 567
(1927); Cannon v. Lincoln Nat. Life Ins. Co., 208 Wis. 452, 243 N. W. 320 (1932). See
Patten, loc. cit. supra notes 25, 26; Israel, Exemption of Life Insurance Policies in New Jer-
sey (1930) 7 A. B. REV. 76; Grade, Exemption of Life Insurance Policies under Tennessee
Statutes and in Bankruptcy (1933) II TENN. L. REv. 84; Note (1934) 8 TuLANE L. REV.
451.
46. Cf. the provisions of standard ordinary life policies of the Equitable Life Assurance
Society, which permit insured to elect, on default (a) to receive net cash surrender value of
the policy; "(b) To continue this policy as non-participating paid-up life insurance, payable
at the time and on the conditions provided in this policy, for such an amount as the cash
value determined in accordance with [an attached] table reduced by the amount of any in-
debtedness (including interest) to the Society against this policy will purchase as a net single
premium at the Insured's attained age, to which amount shall be added the amount of any
Dividend Additions; or (c) To continue the insurance as non-participating paid-up extended
term insurance for the face amount of this policy plus the amount of any Dividend Additions
and less the amount of any indebtedness (including interest) to the Society against this pol-
icy, and for such period from the due date of the premium in default as the net cash value
of this policy . . . will purchase as a net single premium at the Insured's attained age."
Furthermore, under this policy "The Insured may elect . . . to have the net sum due
under this policy upon it maturity applied under one . . . of the following optional modes
of settlement in lieu of a single sum settlement. . . . i. Deposit Option. . . . 2. Instal-
ment Option: Fixed Period. . . . 3. Life Income Option. . . . 4. Instalment Option:
Fixed Amount ..
47. Supra, p. 237.
48. Cf. Blinn v. Dame, 2o7 Mass. 159, 93 N. E. 6oi (1911).
49. Holden v. Stratton, 198 U. S. 202 (1905).
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process against the insured so long as the duty of the insurer to pay is subject
to any contingency, or to any condition precedent," 50 and this is substantiated
by a preponderance of the decided cases. 51  But the same author's later pro-
nouncement, that "where the only condition to the insurer's promise to pay
an agreed surrender value is the insured's giving up the policy for cancella-
tion, the courts generally permit the attaching creditor to deliver up the policy
and receive the surrender value," 52 is, in the light of case authority, open to
some doubt. As a matter of actuality, the courts hold fairly uniformly that
the right of election is one personal to and "vested in" the insured, and no one
but he may exercise it.53  On the whole, it appears that here again the ques-
tion, one largely dependent on personal opinion, is subject to be resolved either
way. The result reached by a majority of the courts is compatible with the
penchant, already indicated, for befriending the debtor.
(b) Creditors' Remedies Outside of Bankruptcy
Attachment and garnishment are the principal bases of creditors' reme-
dies outside of the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act. It has been further
stated that "under some circumstances, a creditor may reach the proceeds of
a policy during the lifetime of the insured by a creditor's bill." 54 On the
last point respectable case authority is wanting, and indeed it seems difficult
to imagine how such a bill could be maintained (insurance policies being
circumvallated by law as they now are) in the absence of fraud on the part
of the insured. 55  As to attachment and garnishment processes, it is practi-
cally platitudinous to remark that they are unavailable unless and until there
is a "debt due" from the garnishee or whomever occupies a cognate position.
The inquiry thus narrows to, When is the debt in fact due? And the courts,
as before intimated, have answered almost unanimously, Not until the insured
has exercised his rights under the policy; a court of equity cannot compel him
to do so, and will not render a decree which purports to do so for him.
56 Of
course, if insured once makes his election, the debt of the company becomes
due as of that moment, and may then be garnished or reached by attachment.
5"
Should the cash value be already paid to insured, an a fortiori case is pre-
sented.5 ' It happens in these situations that syllogistic reasoning gives results
in accordance with what has been the definite drift of decision; hence statutes
on the subject would not seem necessary, nor is there much probability that,
without a complete judicial reaction, this form of ratiocination will be
abandoned.
Of considerably more than casual interest, however, is the question
raised by two recent cases in the federal district courts.
59 The facts in each
50. VANCE, INSURANCE (2d eo. 1930) § I6l.
51. See Note (1926) 44 A. L.R. 1188.
52. VANCe, INSURANCE (2d ed. 1930) § 161.
53. See Note (x928) 57 A. L. R. 695.
54. 8 COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW (1931) § 1932.
55. Cf. Murphy v. Casey, 150 Minn. 1O7, 184 N. W. 783 (1921).
56. Farmers & Merchants Bank v. Nat. Life Ins. Co., 161 Ga. 793, 131 S. E. 9o2 (1926);
Columbia Bank v. Equitable Life Ass. Society, 79 App. Div. 6oi, 8o N. Y. Supp. 428 (Ist
Dep't, 19o3) ; Martin v. Balis, I8 D. & C. 187 (Pa. 1932).
57. Cooper v. West, 173 Ky. 289, 19o S. W. 1o85 (1917).
58. In the analogous case of dividends (New York Plumbers' Specialties Co. v. Stein,
136 Misc. 703, 240 N. Y. Supp. 834 [N. Y. City Cts. 193o]) see Martin v. Balis, 18 D. & C.
187 (Pa. 1932).
59- McGuirk v. Kyle, io F. Supp. 705 (E. D. Pa. 1935); Cannon v. Nicholas, io F.
Supp. 7,8 (D. Colo. 1935). Both are noted elsewhere in this issue, p. 262.
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were substantially identical. Insured was insolvent. The federal govern-
ment, being a creditor for back taxes, garnisheed the insurance company.
Insured contended the state exemption statute applied to the cash surrender
value of his policies, that the beneficiary thereof had acquired vested rights
therein, and that consequently the attachments were invalid. One court
decided that the state statute was one of "exemption" only; that it could not
prevail over the mandate of the federal statute which authorized attachments
in situations like that under notice; and that therefore the attachment was
regular and effective. 60 The other court held that the state law created a
"property right" in the beneficiary, not a mere privilege in the insured; that
no act of Congress could constitutionally deprive the beneficiary of that right;
and that therefore the attachment was void."1 The two decisions seem totally
irreconcilable. But aside from this, the question itself is not only novel but
significant; it offers a picture, in strongly contrasted colors, of the rights of
the most powerful creditors' force-the government of the United States-
on the one hand, and the stronghold of judicial protection of the beneficiary
(and, incidentally, the insured) on the other. The outcome can scarcely be
adumbrated; but the decision in favor of the insured shows to what extent
a sympathetic court will proceed in statutory construction where such is
necessary to defend the inviolability of cash surrender values.
ENDOWMENT POLICIES.
Endowment policies, roughly speaking, are those in which it is provided
that insured, on paying premiums over a certain period of years (during
which time the policy is in force as life insurance, payable to a designated
beneficiary in the event of insured's decease) will receive the face value of the
policy in cash at the end of the specified (so-called "tontine") period. 62 This
outlandish contract was, and to a certain degree still is, the foundation of
much conflict. Many earlier statutes confined their exemption provisions
to "life insurance," in which event it occasionally became necessary to
pass upon the question whether an endowment policy was "life insurance"
within the purview of the statute. Originally the theory advanced, and
finally adopted by a majority of state courts, was that the contract was one
primarily of investment and only incidentally of insurance. 63 The leading
case on this side of the argument 64 contained in the opinion both the theory
just set forth and the additional one that "the transaction partakes more of
the character of a loan . . [and] the money so invested belongs to the
debtor; . . . the mere act of filtering it thru the insurance company will
not transmute it so it becomes the property of the beneficiary . " 0
Becoming widely accepted, the above arguments long retained their strength
so that at least one author felt constrained to say, in 1921, "It is well settled
that endowment policies . . . pass to the trustee in bankruptcy to the extent
of their cash surrender value." 66 Yet the same author, eight years later,
6o. Cannon v. Nicholas, supra note 59.
6x. McGuirk v. Kyle, supra note 59.
62. Cf. Talcott v. Field, 34 Neb. 6xi, 614, 615, 52 N. W. 400, 401 (1892).
63. Note (9o6) 4 L. R. A. (N. s.) 456; VANCE, INsuRANCE (2d ed. 1930) p. 548.
64. Talcott v. Field, 34 Neb. 61i, 5z N. W. 40o (1892).
65. Id. at 614, 52 N. W. at 401.
66. Patten, Do General State Exemption Statutes in Favor of Itsured's Wife Protect
"Right to Change" Policies Payable to Her, Containing No Endounnent Feature, From His
Trustee in Bankruptcy? (1921) i PROCEEDINGS OF THE AssociATioN OF LIFE INSURANCE
CouNsEr., no. LII, at p. 18.
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considered it equally incumbent to remark: "I now think . . . endowment
policies . . . should be considered as on the same footing with straight life
policies in the matter of exemption." 67 Both statements were on the whole
justified, even when regarded outside of the field to which they were directly
applicable-bankruptcy. What theory on the other side was so compelling
as to cause a small revolution in the law? One of the earliest and fullest
expositions can be read in the California case of Briggs v. McCullough,5"
where it is said, in part: "The term 'life insurance' is not alone applicable to
an insurance for the full term of one's life. On the contrary, it may be for a
term of years, or until the assured shall arrive at a certain age. It is simply
an undertaking on the part of the insurer that either at the death of the
assured, whenever that event may occur, or on his death, if it shall happen
within a specified term, or before attaining a certain age, as the case may be,
there shall be paid a stipulated sum. In either form it is, strictly speaking,
an insurance on the life of the party." 69 Although the argument that endow-
ment policies are life policies because they relate to the tenure of life of the
insured 70 may not address itself so forcefully to the ears of 1935, the present
majority view, grounded upon that argument, is to the same effect.7 1 Again
one is obliged to conclude that not the unassailability of the logic but the
progressing notions of the courts and the public in general have engendered
this development. Another indication of the truth of the last statement is
the regularity with which exemption statutes in relatively recent years have
expressly included endowment insurance in their protective embrace.
7 2
ACCIDENT AND DISABILITY POLICIES
All of the Protean forms an insurance policy can-and does-assume
are manifestly not within the periphery of this note. The large body of
law, both judicial and statutory, on the subject of group insurance has not
been consulted; the same is true of workmen's compensation and other forms
of industrial insurance; fire, theft and kindred aspects of the insurance con-
tract are palpably foreign to the topic in hand; and the constituent elements
of the above heading might likewise well be divorced from the present dis-
cussion. A brief reference is made to them solely to demonstrate further
the inclination of the law. Accident policies are clearly related in some way
to life insurance; the doubtful ingredient is the degree of consanguinity.
Disability benefits are just as clearly unrelated, or are at least mere affines.
In the former there are quite as many provisions in pure self-interest as
there are for the protection of the insured's family; in the latter this pro-
tection is reduced to the veriest cobweb. Yet state legislatures persistently
enact laws which exempt the avails of such policies from the claims of credi-
tors. The one state which makes no provision whatsoever for the exemption
of life insurance has nevertheless a statute specifically exempting weekly or
monthly installment payments to the holder of a policy of accident insurance,
67. Patten, The Effect of Insured's Bankruptcy on Policies Payable to His Wife, but
Reserving the Right to Change (1929) 4 PROCE lNGS OF THE AssociATioN OF LIFE INsuR-
ANCE COUNSEL, 259, 285.
68. 36 Cal. 542 (i869).
69. Id. at 550.
7o. Flood v. Libby, 38 Wash. 366, 8o Pac. 533 (1905).
71. VANCE, INSURANCE (2d ed. i93o) p. 547. Contra: In re Young, 2o8 Fed. 373 (N.
D. Ohio 1912).
72. See, e. g., IOWA CoDE (1931) § 8776; ME. REv. STAT. (1930) c. 6o, § r44; 2 S. D.
Comp. LAws (1929) § 9310.
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or the like.73  Seven other jurisdictions exhibit laws more or less dispositive
of the subject.7 4  And it is to be expected that others will follow, for many
of the foregoing acts are comparatively recent of promulgation. The ulti-
mate result is well exemplified in a line of cases under the former New York
statute.7 5  A lower court, apparently acute to the prevailing sentiment con-
cerning insurance benefits in general, ruled that disability payments were
tantamount, in legal contemplation, to cash surrender values.7 6 This was
affirmed without opinion in the Appellate Division.77  Shortly afterwards
another trial court held disability benefits not exempt under the same stat-
ute,78 and the same volume of reports contains yet another case disallowing
exemption.7 9  With the law in this condition, a federal district court like-
wise refused to protect disability doles.80 The Gordian knot was cut by the
legislature's passing a new section to the Insurance Law expressly exempting
these payments."' It is submitted that the explanation lies not in the desire
to safeguard a forlorn widow and helpless children, but in a growing sensi-
tivity to the readjustment in the relations between debtor and creditor.
ANNUITIES
By far the most youthful venture of the resourceful insurance compa-
nies is the annuity contract. This kind of "insurance" involves, in the
typical instance, a lump sum paid to the company, which engages in return
to deal out to the payor or to a beneficiary indicated by him a definite sum
annually during the life of the annuitant. 2  Once more, however, there are
ingenious variations very nearly infinite; a good many modern annuity
contracts, for example, provide for payments by annuitant (suspiciously
resembling "premiums") during a certain period and thereafter payments
by the grantor during annuitant's life.83 These contracts in turn are capable
73. VA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 193o) § 42ig.
74. Ark. Laws 1933, no. 102, p. 321; 48 STAT. 1125, 1175 (Dist. Col. 1934) ; IOWA CODE
(1931) § 8776; 2 LA. GEN. STAT. ANN. (Dart, 1932) § 4105; Neb. Laws 1933, C. 73; N. Y.
CONS. LAWS (Cahill, Cum. Supp. 1931-1935) C. 30, § 55b; PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, Supp.
1934) tit. 40, § 766.
75. N. Y. CONS. LAws (Cahill, 193o) c. 30, § 55a.
76. Wittman v. Littlefield, 142 Misc. 916, 256 N. Y. Supp. 471 (Sup. Ct. 1932).
77. Wittman v. Littlefield, 235 App. Div. 831, 257 N. Y. Supp. 885 (Ist Dep't 1932).
78. Herbach v. Herbach, 148 Misc. 33, 265 N. Y. Supp. I44 (N. Y. City Cts. 1933).
79. Lion Credit Union v. Gutman, 148 Misc. 620, 265 N. Y. Supp. 479 (N. Y. City Cts.
1932).
8o. In re Kern, 8 F. Supp. 246 (S. D. N. Y. 1934).
8i. N. Y. CONS. LAWS (Cahill, Cum. Supp. 1931-1935) c. 30, § 55b.
82. Cf. I CoucH, CYcLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW (1929) § 25; People ex rel. Metro-
politan Life Ins. Co. v. Knapp, 193 App. Div. 413, 415, 184 N. Y. Supp. 345, 346 (3d Dep't
1920).
83. See, for example, the standard annual payment retirement annuity of the Equitable
Life Assurance Society, which provideg that the Society "Hereby agrees to pay a life an-
nuity to ................ subject to the conditions hereinafter stated, in monthly payments
of ............ Dollars, beginning on the anniversary of the Register date of this contract
upon which the Annuitant's age at nearest birthday is ........ years . . . but at any
time prior to commencement of such Annuity payments on said date the Annuitant may . . .
elect . . . in lieu thereof either: (i) A Life Annuity beginning at any age shown [in a
table elsewhere in the contract] with monthly payments of the respective amounts provided
in [an attached schedule], or (2) A Ten Years Certain Life Annuity beginning at any age
shown in said Table . . with monthly payments [according to a second schedule at-
tached]."
Certain "options" are also included; e. g., that of receiving the surrender value within
three months after default, and that of continuing the contract as a paid-up annuity, under
similar circumstances.
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of subdivision into (i) those providing that payments by the grantor shall
cease absolutely at the death of annuitant, regardless of when it shall occur
and of how much return there has actually been on the original capital paid
in by annuitant, and (2) those providing for payment on annuitant's death
over to a named beneficiary of any moneys still in reserve. From even a
superficial scrutiny of such contracts it should appear that protection of his
family as such is almost the last thing in the annuitant's mind, unless he
effects the annuity exclusively for the benefit of a wife, child, etc.-which,
it may be added, is comparatively rare in annuities taken out during the last
few years, the time of the ascendency of these forms of insurance. While
the case authority is as yet meagre, some definite trend can be read there-
from and from pertinent legislation. Statutes imposing taxes on "policies"
or "gross premiums" issued or collected by "insurance corporations" have
been held not to apply to annuities; 84 a recent Oregon case decided that
a statute forbidding the issuance of life insurance policies until a form
thereof had been filed with the state insurance commissioner did not compre-
hend annuity contracts in its intendment8 5 Admittedly these cases have but
scratched the surface; none can be said to hold that an annuity is exempt
from claims of creditors, either of its own force or by virtue of a statute
exempting life insurance and endowment policies.8 6 On the other hand, one
is again faced with a statutory development leaning toward express exemp-
tion of annuities.87  And the point is further clinched by a recent case in the
Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, 8 which might profitably be
here set out in some detail. The contract in question, a "single premium
retirement annuity," stipulated for monthly payments to annuitant at
age 65 and thereafter. It contained provisions for a cash surrender value
and it reserved to annuitant the right to change the beneficiary. It stated,
moreover, that if annuitant were to die before the first payment by the
company (grantor) his wife should receive the payments according to a
schedule therein incorporated; furthermore, that if annuitant should die
without leaving any designated beneficiary living, the payments were to be
made to annuitant's children, or, failing any issue surviving, to his executors
or administrators. The relevant (Pennsylvania) statute exempted "The
net amount payable under any . . . annuity contract upon the life of any
person, . . . made for the benefit of . . .the wife or children or dependent
relative of such person." 89 Analogizing from the rules concerning endow-
ment policies, the court held the above annuity contract exempt under the
statute. In the opinion appears this statement: "We think it clear that
84. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. Commonwealth, 227 Mass. 63, 116 N. E. 469 (1917) ;
People ex rel. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Knapp, 193 App. Div. 413, 184 N. Y. Supp. 345
(3d Dep't 192o) aff'd 231 N. Y. 630, 132 N. E. 916 (1921); Commonwealth v. Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co., 254 Pa. 5Io, 98 Atl. lO72 (1916).
85. Hall v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 146 Ore. 32, 28 P. "(2d) 875 (934).
86. But cf. People v. Security Life Ins. & Annuity Co., 78 N. Y. 114 (1879).
87. See, e. g., Ga. Laws 1933, no. 336, p. 181; 2 LA. GEN. STAT. ANN. (Dart, 1932)
§41o5, amended La. Laws 1934, no. 155; ME. REv. STAT. (1930) c. 6o, § 144; Neb. Laws
1933, c. 73; N. Y. CONS. LAws (Cahill, Cum. Supp. 1931-1935) c. 30, § 55c; OHIO CODE
ANN. (Throckmorton's Baldwin, 1934) § 9394; PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 193o) tit. 40,
§§ 515, 517; TENN. CODE (1932) § 8458; TEx. STAT. (1928) art. 5o68a.
88. Bowers v. Reinhard, 78 F. (2d) 776 (C. C. A. 3d, 1935) cert. denied sub oM.
Reinhard v. Bowers, Nov. II, 1935, U. S. L. Week, Nov. 12, 1935, at 45.
89. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 40, § 517.
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where, as in this case, the wife is named beneficiary, the contract is 'made
for the benefit' of the wife." 90 Notable here is the same kind of reasoning
that was seen in the cases involving endowment policies; it is suggested that
this is a sufficient foreshadowing of the final judicial word on the subject
of exemption of annuities. If this prognostication prove correct, another
important wing will have been added to the legal sanctuary which, in protect-
ing insurance contracts by exemption to the insured, simultaneously aids in
sheltering the modern Antonio from the too-importunate demands of a
twentieth-century Shylock.
B. W.L.
go. Bowers v. Reinhard, 78 F. (2d) 776, 777 (C. C. A. 3d, 1935).
